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Seeking Local Government Financial Integrity
Through Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and
Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal
Crisis, the Taxpayers' Revolt, and Beyondt
M. David Gelfand*
The severe financial distress of many large American cities, high-
lighted by New York City's near bankruptcy and Cleveland's bond
default, has generated considerable commentary in business, govern-
mental, and scholarly circles, as well as in the popular press. In the
welter of proposals and counterproposals for short-term and long-
term "solutions," the legal devices originally intended to prevent
fiscal mismanagement by cities-debt ceilings, tax limits, and ex-
penditure limits-have received inadequate attention. Moreover, re-
cent attempts to satisfy voter demands for tax relief have often fo-
cused upon a single fiscal control device while neglecting much
needed reform of the overall local government financial management
system.
This Article reappraises the efficacy of state constitutional debt
ceilings and tax limitations, and statutory expenditure limitations,
as controls on local government finance. First, the Article traces their
general history; thereafter it considers the operation of constitutional
tax and debt limitations in New York and local government expendi-
ture limits in Arizona. In neither state have these limits restricted
borrowing, taxing, or spending. Instead, they have spawned a series
of municipal and legislative avoidance devices which have them-
selves produced adverse financial effects.
Having determined that the current mechanisms for control of
municipal finance are insufficient, this Article next evaluates alter-
native approaches on the basis of informational, economic, and polit-
ical principles. Tighter constitutional limits are contrasted with
statutory, market, and political controls. Finally, the efficacy of
electoral approval and administrative oversight mechanisms is
considered.
Although this Article offers no easy solutions to the problems it
addresses, it does sketch the outlines of a rational system of con-
t Copyright 1979 by M. David Gelfand.
* Assistant Professor, Tulane University School of Law. The author expresses his
appreciation to Gilbert Singer, Frank Cook, William Cassell, and Linda Furman for
their very valuable research assistance, and to his colleagues for their helpful com-
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straints and suggests factors to be considered by a state when revising
its municipal fiscal control devices.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. DEBT CEILNGS
Constitutional debt ceilings were first imposed in the nineteenth
century in reaction to unsuccessful entreprenurial activities under-
taken by states. During the early part of the last century, many states
floated bonds backed by their general taxing power to finance sub-
stantial improvements in transportation and other commercial pro-
jects.' After the economic panic of 1837, tax and project revenues
were insufficient to meet the debt service and high fixed costs of these
investments. 2 As a result, several states defaulted or suspended pay-
ments on their obligations during the 1840s, and four actually repu-
diated portions of their debt. In an effort to avoid repetition of such
disquieting financial experiences, restrictive limitations on state-
incurred debt were incorporated not only into the constitutions of
these states but also into those of states subsequently entering the
union.'
Local governments, generally unrestricted by these original limi-
1. The first such project was the Erie Canal, financed by the State of New York.
Its success induced other states to construct additional canals and highways. Mitchell,
The Effectiveness of Debt Limits on State and Local Government Borrowing, 45
N.Y.U. INST. OF FMANcE Buss. 1 (1967).
2. A. HEINS, CoNs.rrLoNsAL REsTIcTIONs AGAINST STATE DzmT 7-8 (1963); Ni-
chols, Debt Limitations and the Bona Fide Long-Term Lease with an Option to Pur-
chase: Another Look at Lord Coke, 9 UR. LAw. 403,406 (1977); Willatt, Constitutional
Restrictions on Use of Public Money and Public Credit, 38 Tax. B.J. 413, 416 (1975).
See Newell v. People ex rel. Phelps, 7 N.Y. 9, 26-27 (1852) (describing New York's
financial embarrassment at the time).
3. See B. RATCHFORD, AmmcAN STATE DEsTs 98-120 (1941); Mitchell, supra note
1, at 11-12.
4. Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IowA L. Rav. 863, 863-
64 (1967); Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The
Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234, 241 (1958); Nichols, supra
note 2, at 406. In New York, there was strong reaction against the drastic, direct
property tax that had to be imposed to prevent bankruptcy of the State government:
Public indignation brought about the Constitutional Convention of 1846, by
which amendments were adopted whizh were approved by the people, re-
stricting legislative borrowing, making the State Comptroller an elective
official independent of the Legislature, and prohibiting loans to individuals,
associations and corporations. Conditions were somewhat, but not greatly
relieved, and the Constitutional Convention of 1867 took further steps to
correct continuing evils.
Lounsberry, The Scope and Basis of the Local Finance Law, in N.Y. LocAL FiN. LAW
viii (McKinney 1968).
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tations, financed much of the railroad boom of the mid-nineteenth
century, thereby assuming the enterpreneurial role that the earlier
restrictions had forced state governments to abandon. In competing
for these new transportation facilities, the localities provided guaran-
tees for railroad securities, made outright purchases of railroad
stocks, and even offered gifts of land and rights of way to the rail-
roads. Consequently, municipal credit, like state credit earlier in the
century, soon became overextended.' It has been estimated that fully
thirteen to twenty percent of municipal bonds were in default during
the 1873-1879 depression.7 In reaction, constitutional debt restric-
tions were extended to encompass local as well as state governments.,
Additional restrictions were imposed in the wake of a new wave of
municipal defaults that coincided with the panic and depression of
1893.1
Many of the early proponents of constitutional limitations
sought a total prohibition of debt financing by state and local govern-
ments.'0 For example, some delegates to the 1846 Wisconsin Constitu-
5. Local government debt was relatively small during the period of state defaults,
totalling only $25 million in 1840, compared to $175 million then outstanding in state
debt. By 1860, the two figures were much closer; outstanding local government debt
had risen to $200 million, while state debt totalled $257 million. By 1870 local govern-
ment debt, at $516 million outstanding, had substantially outstripped state govern-
ment debt, then at $353 million outstanding. That pattern has generally continued to
the present. See A. HInLousE, MuNIdn'A BONDS: A CENTURY OF EXPERIENcC 36 (1936);
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 12-15.
6. Bowmar, supra note 4, at 864; Morris, supra note 4, at 241; Williams & Neh-
emkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations, 37
COLUM. L. REv. 177, 177-80 (1937); Note, Constitutional Provisions Concerning Munic-
ipal Bonds in New York State, 20 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 184, 184 (1954).
7. See, e.g., A. HILLHOUSE, supra note 5, at 16-17; Shanks, The Extent of Munici-
pal Defaults, 24 NAT'L MUNIcIPAL REv. 32, 32 (1935). One author has concluded that
creditors lost $10-15 million as a result of these defaults. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 12.
8. Morris, supra note 4, at'241; Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 6, at 177-80.
Although restrictions on the debt incurred by local governments in New York State
were consistently proposed, beginning as early as the Constitutional Convention of
1846 (which imposed restrictions on state debt), a prohibition on the lending of munici-
pal credit was not approved until 1874. Constitutional tax and debt limitations were
first imposed on New York municipalities in 1884. Lounsberry, supra note 4, at ix-xiii.
It is noteworthy that local debt could have been limited by the legislature during this
period, for at that time New York local government debt financing depended on repeat-
edly obtaining statutory authorization. Id. at ix-xi. See, e.g., Act of May 18, 1869, ch.
907, 1869 N.Y. Laws 2303 (general authorization to lend town money to railroads).
9. A. HILLHOUSE, supra note 5, at 40. State and local governments defaulted on
bonds throughout the 1830-1930 period, during both good and bad economic times.
Constitutional and statutory restrictions on borrowing were imposed, however, only
when defaults were widespread-during panics and depressions. Id. at 3; Mitchell,
supra note 1, at 16.
10. See Comment, The Judicial Demise of State Constitutional Debt
19791
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tional Convention, displaying a "horror of public debt,"" proposed
that "[n]o municipal corporation shall have power to contract debts
. . . for any purpose whatever."" Likewise, a faction of the California
Convention of 1879 sought to impose a no-debt policy on local author-
ities.'" Although these extreme proposals advocating absolute preclu-
sion of debt financing failed," the restrictions adopted in the mid-
nineteenth century did generally establish very low debt ceilings,'"
both at the state and local levels of government.'6
Limitations, 56 IowA L. REv. 646, 646 (1971). The following editorial comment appears
to be representative of the views of the financial community at the time, and perhaps
of the general public as well: "[A]s all experience shows that the use of public credit
by local officials defies successful regulation, it follows that the primary error was in
the original grant of the power to borrow money." Bradstreet's, May 22, 1880, at 4,
col. 2, quoted in Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 6, at 180-81. Nor was the problem
unique to the United States, as is revealed by the introductory sentence to Lord
Avebury's treatise: "The portentous and rapidly growing increase of rates and munici-
pal debts has roused the anxiety of all thoughtful citizens. . . . Though we pay so
much, we are not paying our way. The local authorities [in Great Britain] are running
head over heels in debt." Loan AvEBuRY ON MUNICIPAL AND NATIONAL TRADING 1-2
(1906), quoted in 1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIS ON THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
337 n.2 (5th ed. 1911).
11. McGalloway, Historical Background of the Constitution of Wisconsin, in 1
Wis. STAT. ANN. 1, 9 (West 1957).
12. JOURNAL OF THE [1846] CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 133 (1847), quoted in
Kiernan, Wisconsin Municipal Indebtedness: Part 1-The Power to Become Indebted
and Its Limits, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 173, 186.
13. See 2 CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
1068 (1881) (discussion of Jan. 18, 1879).
14. The proposed amendment totally forbidding Wisconsin municipalities to
incur debt, after being repeatedly amended, was finally rejected by the 1846 conven-
tion. Kiernan, supra note 12, at 186. Instead of adopting a no-debt policy, the Califor-
nia Constitutional Convention of 1879 permitted local debt if it was approved by two-
thirds of the qualified electors or could be repaid within 20 years from a sinking fund,
supplied by annual taxation. See CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 18.
15. See, e.g., sources cited in Morris, supra note 4, at 241.
16. In addition, constitutional provisions limiting the maturity periods of bonds
were adopted. See A. HEINS, supra note 2, at 31 (discussing the circumvention of
Maryland's 15-year maturity limit through the use of revenue bonds). Also, the lending
of municipal credit or donation of public money were prohibited during the same
period. According to the Texas Supreme Court, the object of the prohibition of gifts
or loans, added to the Texas Constitution in 1880, was to
deprive municipalities of the power possessed by them under the constitu-
tion of 1869, in the exercise of which many counties and towns in the state
assumed burdens not yet discharged, in anticipation of benefits never real-
ized. The increase in population and values expected from railway connec-
tion in many instances never came; and the tax, not lightened from these
sources, depressed values, prevented immigration, and became a curse to the
localities which had invited it as a blessing.
City of Cleburne v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 66 Tex. 457, 460, 1 S.W. 342, 342 (1886).
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The pattern for constitutional debt ceilings that prevails in most
states today" was established by these restrictions imposed in the
early and mid-nineteenth century. Overall debt for any particular
year was limited to a specified percentage of the value of the assessed
real property within the state or locality."8 Debt ceilings were framed
in this manner because funds for debt service were derived at the time
almost entirely from property tax revenue. 9 Moreover, real estate
property owners were regarded as a class deserving special protection
from excessive taxes.2 0
Courts2 l' and commentators2 have agreed that the principal pur-
pose of the nineteenth century constitutional debt ceilings was to
limit the capacity of local officials to incur long-term financial com-
mitments in order to protect the interests of taxpayers, especially
those of future generations, and, to a lesser extent, bondholders.
Creditor protection was of lesser concern, since it can be, and has
been, provided by other means.? Since current taxpayers actually
Current New York provisions prohibiting the gift or loan of public credit are contained
in N.Y. CONsT. art. VII, § 8 (state credit), and id. art. VIII, § 1 (municipal credit).
17. See, e.g., IDAHO CoNsT. art. VIII, § 3; IOWA CONsT. art. XI, § 3; N.Y. CONST.
art. VIII, § 4; VA. CONST. art. Vii, § 10; Wis. CoNsT. art. XI, § 3.
18. The Iowa municipal debt limitation, adopted in 1857, is typical. It declares
that no municipal corporation could become indebted in an amount exceeding five
percent of the value of taxable real property within the municipality. IowA CONsT. art
XI, § 3.
19. Virtue, The Public Use of Private Capital: A Discussion of Problems Related
to Municipal Bond Financing, 35 VA. L. REv. 285 (1949). The broad range of local taxes
and user charges now available to service public debt, see notes 140-42 infra and
accompanying text, did not exist at that time. Indeed, the only sources of local govern-
ment revenue during the nineteenth century besides local real estate taxes and state
grants were funds generated by individual capital projects. Moreover, even these pro-
jects were secured by the real estate taxing power of the state or local government,
since the revenue bond did not develop until this century. See generally Greenberg,
Municipal Securities: Some Basic Principles and Practices, 9 URB. LAw. 338, 341-45
(1977).
20. Bowmar, supra note 4, at 867.
21. See, e.g., Law v. People ex rel Huck, 87 Ill. 385, 396 (1877) ("to effectually
protect persons residing in municipalities from the abuse of their credit and the conse-
quent oppression of burthensome, if not ruinous, taxation"); Sun Printing & Publish-
ing Ass'n. v. Mayor of New York, 152 N.Y. 257, 268-69, 46 N.E. 499, 501-02 (1897).
22. C. ANnEAU, 2 MUNICIPAL CORPOATION LAw § 15.29, at 15-59 (1973); 1 J.
DILLON, supra note 10, at 336-37; Virtue, supra note 19, at 288, 289; Comment, supra
note 10, at 654. With respect to the New York restrictions, one commentator has
observed: "These constitutional provisions were intended to provide a sound basis for
the issuance of municipal bonds and to prevent a continuation of the utter extrava-
gances, flagrant disregard of individual taxpayers' rights and other corrupt abuses so
widely prevailing prior to 1873." Note, supra note 6, at 184.
23. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (contract clause); N.Y. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2, para. 4 (bondholders' right of action to compel setting apart payment of
19791
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pay less when their government borrows money to pay for a project
rather than pays for it from general revenues, the real beneficiaries
of debt ceilings were the taxpayers of the future, who would not have
to pay inordinate debt service on capital projects producing no tangi-
ble benefits for them. As the New York Court of Appeals recognized,
"[tihe mischief to be prevented was the creation of an excessive
debt, the carrying charges of which would fall upon current revenues,
and the principal upon posterity." 4
Contemporary economists label this concept "intergenerational
equity." This principle requires each generation of taxpayers to pay,
through debt service or otherwise, for its "stream of use" of govern-
ment structures and services.2 Thus, one generation should not be
permitted to enjoy a low tax level by borrowing to finance the cost of
a structure that will not provide benefits for the next generation,
which will have to bear the burden of financing.26 At the same time,
interest and amortization from first revenues of local government should latter fail to
make annual appropriation). See generally Fordham, Methods of Enforcing Satisfac-
tionof Obligations of Public Corporations, 33 COLUM. L. Rv. 28 (1933); note 251 infra.
24. McCabe v. Gross, 274 N.Y. 39, 46, 8 N.E.2d 271-72 (1937).
25. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PuBLic FINANcE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
585-91 (1973). See generally, PuBLic DEBT AND FUTURE GENEAaTIONS (J. Ferguson ed.
1964) (collection of essays debating effect of intergenerational burden transfers, mostly
in context of national debt).
26. Another way of measuring intergenerational equity in public finance is to
determine what effect money borrowed by government has upon capital formation in
the economy, and thus upon the income of future generations. The "classical model"
proceeds on two assumptions: that one dollar of tax or loan by the public sector reduces
private expenditures by one dollar and that taxation falls largely on consumption,
while public debt falls largely on savings or investment.
Although this analysis is a "reasonable first approximation," it must be modified
slightly, especially when applied to state and local finance. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUS-
GRAVE, supra note 25, at 491, 587-89. In the first place, taxation probably causes a
sharper reduction in private expenditure than the classical model suggests, and some
forms of taxation, such as the retained earning tax and (to a lesser extent) the personal
income tax, tend to reduce private investment as well as consumption. Id. at 475-80,
492, 587-89. These taxes are now available to many local governments. See notes 140,
216-17, infra and accompanying text. Second, to the extent that state and local bonds
are held by outside investors, the reduction in capital formation predicted by the
classical model does not occur, because local residents in the present generation do not
have to reduce either savings or consumption in order to provide debt financing for
their governments. See R. MUSGRAV & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 25, at 589-90. While
it is difficult to obtain sufficient data with respect to the holders of all state and local
debt, bonds issued by states and larger cities appear to be held by investors throughout
the country. On the other hand, states that tax their residents' income but provide an
exemption for interest earned on their own bonds and those of their localities may have
(depending on how steep their income tax rates are) a slightly higher relative propor-
tion of in-state investors, thus conforming more closely to the classical model. Even
in these states, however, purchasers of local government debt can obtain this benefit
without being residents of the issuing locality.
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the present generation should not have to pay the full cost of govern-
ment structures that will also benefit the next generation; both
should share debt service, maintenance costs, and depreciation in
proportion to the benefit each receives."
B. TAx LIMITATIONS
The most common limitation on local government taxing power
is restriction of the real estate tax rate. Local government tax limits
initially appeared in state statutes in the 1870s and 1880s.2 Alabama
in 1875 and New York in 18849 became the first states to constitu-
tionalize these local government real estate tax limits.30 Although the
principal concern characterizing this era was the limitation of local
government debt powerp,3 ' some saw tax limits as an adjunct remedy
necessary to prevent an increase in taxes to pay for capital projects
previously financed by public debt. 2 Early property tax limits, like
the debt ceilings, were thus aimed at reducing the growth of~public
expenditures. Since nearly all local government revenues were de-
rived from the property tax at that time," a property tax rate limit
was believed to be the most effective means for controlling current
expenditures.' In addition, the limits were aimed at the narrower
None of this is to deny the intergenerational inequity of taxing future generations
of state and local residents to pay interest on bonds whose benefits they do not enjoy,
whether the investors reside inside or outside the jurisdiction.
27. Id. at 589. Hence, the no-debt policies proposed in the nineteenth century,
see notes 10-16 supra and accompanying text, would also violate intergenerational
equity.
28. The earliest tax limits applied only to the classes of local government (coun-
ties, municipalities, or school districts) specified in the limiting statutes. U.S. ADvo-
SORY COMMISSION ON INTFRGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATU-
TORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL TAXiNG Pow-ns 28 (1962) [hereinafter cited as ACIR,
LocAL TAXiNG]. The first states to adopt statutes imposing property tax rate limits
on all taxing districts in the state were Rhode Island in 1870 and Nevada in 1895. Id.
29. Id. The 1884 New York provision directly restricting the real estate taxation
imposed by most local governments was preceded by a provision in the 1846 Constitu-
tion giving power to the State Legislature "to provide for the organization of cities and
incorporated villages, and to restrict their powers of taxation." N.Y. CONST., art. VIII,
§ 9 (1846, amended 1884).
30. ACIR, LocA TAXING, supra note 28, at 28. The first states to impose constitu-
tional limits on all taxing districts in the state were Oklahoma in 1907 and Ohio in
1911. Id. at 28-29.
31. See notes 8-20 supra and accompanying text.
32. ACIR, LocAL TAXING, supra note 28, at 34; U.S. AnvisoRY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE LIMITATIONS ON LOcAL TAXES AND EXPENDrrURES
11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ACIR, TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS].
33. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
34. ACIR, LocAL TAXING, supra note 28, at 34-35. By the turn of the century, an
additional motive for constitutional tax limitations had emerged: the encouragement
1979]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
interest of protecting property owners" from an undue rise in their
tax burden in the wake of the panic of 1870 and the depression that
followed. "
The next group of constitutional tax limitations emerged during
the depression of the 1930s. As individual income and property values
declined, tax delinquency rose. 7 Property owners and real estate
groups pressured state legislatures and the electorate to lower assess-
ments and impose new or tighter tax limitations. 8 They successfully
persuaded three states to adopt new overall constitutional limitations
and two more to reduce the rate permitted by pre-existing constitu-
tional limits. 9 Unlike earlier tax limits, which were intended to pre-
vent a rise in taxes, the primary purpose of tax restrictions imposed
in the 1930s was to force reductions in then current tax levels. 0
Beginning in 1970, several states have employed a slightly differ-
ent approach to the restriction of property taxes-the levy limit."'
Unlike earlier limits, which restricted the tax rate that could be ap-
plied to assessed (or full) real property values, levy limits establish
the maximum revenue that a jurisdiction's property tax can generate
in a particular year."2 Levy limits, which have uniformly been statu-
tory rather than constitutional, generally allow the total real estate
of uniform tax valuations. See generally id. at 35.
35. Property owners were, at that time, considered a special group deserving
protection from excessive tax levels. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
36. ACIR, TAx AND EXPENDrrURE LimrTs, supra note 32, at 11.
37. See generally Bird, The Trend of Municipal Tax Delinquency, 19 MUNICIPAL
FINANCE (1947).
38. ACIR, LocAL TAxING, supra note 28, at 36-37.
39. In the 1930s, Michigan, West Virginia, and New Mexico imposed constitu-
tional tax limits for the first time, and Ohio and Oklahoma lowered the limits already
in their constitutions. Id. at 30. Limits on taxes to be raised for specific functions were
also adopted by several states during this period. ACIR, TAx AND EXPmNDrruRE Limrrs,
supra note 32, at 12.
40. ACIR, LOCAL TAXING, supra note 28, at 37.
41. See, e.g., ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 42-304(C) (Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 6-1.1-19-1 to .1-19-2 (Bums 1978) (school corporations only); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
79-5001 to -5018 (1977); MINN. STAT. §§ 275.50-.59 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
84.55.010 (West Supp. 1979) (applied to all taxing districts except state and school
districts); Wis. STAT. § 70.62(4) (1975).
42. The property tax levy equals property tax rate multiplied by property tax
base (generally assessed value). The earlier limits operated by restricting the tax rate
component of this equation. The levy limits adopted in the early 1970s were aimed
directly at limiting the tax levy, the overall total of the equation. When assessments
rise substantially, therefore, the rate must be lowered to stay within the levy limit.
ACIR, TAx AND EXPENDITURE LumTS, supra note 32, at 12-14. It should be noted that
the property tax levy is greater than the actual collection of property tax revenue,
because the former includes uncollected property taxes as well. Id. at 15 n.3.
[Vol. 63:545
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tax levy to rise by only a specified percentage each year.4 3 The princi-
pal purpose of levy limits has been to provide property tax relief,
primarily for home owners faced with rising assessments caused by
inflation." These limits can generally be exceeded by referendum45 or
by approval of a state agency.'5 State-mandated cost increases often
are excluded from the levy limits.47
The Jarvins-Gann initiative (Proposition 13),'4 adopted by Cali-
fornia voters in June, 1978, was the first of a new wave of constitu-
tional and statutory property tax rate limits that have swept the
country. This development was referred to in the popular press as
"the tax revolt of 1978."11 In November of that year, voters in seven
states considered proposals for new limits on real estate taxes. 0 Al-
43. In Arizona, "[t]he amount contained in the [local government] budget
estimate as finally adopted, required to be raised by direct taxation, shall in no event
exceed by more than ten per cent the amount levied upon the tax rolls for the preceding
fiscal year [after certain exclusions]." Aiuz. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 42-304(C) (Supp. 1957-
1978). The comparable Minnesota statute provides: "The levy limit base, as adjusted
for previous increases . . . may be increased each year by the governing body of the
government subdivision affected thereby in the amount not to exceed six percent of
the previous year's levy limit base." MnN. STAT. § 275.52(2) (1978). The current
Kansas levy limit permits no increase over the taxes levied for 1969 or 1970. KAN. STAT.
§§ 79-5002 to -5003 (1977).
44. ACIR, TAX AND EXPENDrruRE Limnsr, supra note 32, at 1-2, 4.
45. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-19-4(e)(1)(bb) (Burns 1978) (only under
very limited circumstances); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5012 (1977); MINN. STAT. § 275.58
(1978); Wis. STAT. § 70.62(4)(g) (1975).
46. See Aruz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 42-308(E)-(F) (Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. §§
6-1.1-19-3 to .1-19-4 (Burns 1978).
47. In Minnesota, the levy limit statute provides,
Any governmental subdivision which has been required to provide new serv-
ices because of changes in state law, whether or not the changed law directly
mandates new services, may have its levy limit base increased by an amount
not to exceed the amount required to finance the services, provided that the
services may not be financed by special levies or special assessments.
MINN. STAT. § 275.52(4)(b) (1978). See also Auz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 42-304(C) (Supp.
1978) (excluding increases in salaries of public officials whose salaries are set by state
law).
48. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. For a detailed description of the far-ranging changes
made by this amendment, see Armador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
49. See, e.g., Sound and Fury Over Taxes, TnE, June 19, 1978, at 12.
50. Constitutional amendments similar to California's Proposition 13 were ap-
proved in Idaho, see Act of Mar. 9, 1979, ch. 18, sec. 1, § 2(b), 1979 Idaho Advance
Legis. Serv. Pamph. No. 1, at 10 (to be codified as IDAHO CODE § 63-923), and Nevada.
See Nev. Question No. 6, 1978, General Election Ballot (copy on file with author). The
Nevada proposal requires passage again in 1980 before it can be effective. Id.; see NEV.
CONST. art. XIX, § 2. Voters in non-binding referenda throughout Illinois and in parts
of Massachusetts favored limits on state and local taxes. Perry, Voters in 16 States
Give Approval to 80% of Tax-Cutting Initiatives, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1978, at 4, col.
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though there were overtones of distrust of government and concern
about state and local government expansion,5 the prinicipal purpose
and effect of these new limits, like those imposed in the 1930s and
early 1970s, was property tax relief.52
C. EXPENDITURE LIMdTs
A third method of regulating local government finance has been
direct restriction on the level of spending. The first such expenditure
lid was imposed by statute on Arizona counties and municipalities
in 1921.1 Subject to certain exclusions, it prohibits local budgets from
rising more than ten percent over those of the prior year.5 New Jersey
adopted a similar spending limit in 1976, which restricted local gov-
ernment budget increases to five percent per year. Although subse-
quent attempts to impose local government expenditure limits have
generally been unsuccessful,5' several state government spending
1. But proposed constitutional amendments similar to Proposition 13 failed in Oregon
and Michigan (Tisch Amendment). Id. See also Emshwiller, Tax-Cut Advocates Fight
One Another Instead of City Hall, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1978, at 1, col. 4. For a good
analysis of the salient features of all the above proposals and the final vote count, see
J. Shannon, Slowing Down Public Sector Growth-Hard Questions for Policymakers,
app. A-7 (Dec. 12, 1978) (outline of remarks to Utah Chapter American Society for
Public Administration) (on file with author).
51. See Lipset & Rabb, The Message of Proposition 13, CommENTARY, Sept. 1978,
at 42.
52. See, e.g., Evans, Proposition 13: The Morning After, 51 STATE Gov'T 74, 74-
75 (1978); Peterson & Claxton, Tax and Expenditure Limits: Proposition 13 and its
Alternatives, SPECiAL BuLL., Sept. 5, 1978, at 19 (Municipal Finance Officer's Associa-
tion publication).
53. See note 166 infra and accompanying text.
54. For the wording of the current Arizona expenditure limit law, see text accom-
panying note 167 infra.
55. "Beginning with the tax year 1977 municipalities, other than those having a
municipal purposes tax levy of $0.10 or less per $100.00 and counties shall be prohib-
ited from increasing their final appropriations by more than 5% over the previous year
except within the provisions set forth hereunder." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-45.2 (West
Supp. 1979). A limit on state government expenditures was imposed at the same time.
Rather than the flat percentage lid placed upon local government budget increases,
the state spending limit requires an elaborate formula calculation. See id. § 52:9H-6
to -13. These spending limits were imposed as a concession to the voters, coinciding
with the adoption of New Jersey's first state income tax. Perry & Hyatt, While Califor-
nia Votes on Taxes, Other States Mull Spending Limits, Wall St. J., June 6, 1978, at
1, col. 1.
56. In November, 1978, Nebraska voters defeated a proposed consitutional
amendment to limit local government budget increases to five percent per year, with
additional increases based upon population growth. See Neb. Initiative No. 302 (on
file with author). At the same time, local government spending limits were defeated
in Colorado and Oregon. See J. Shannon, supra note 50, app. A-7, at 4.
[Vol. 63:545
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE
lids" have been adopted."
Spending limits strike more directly at government expansion
than do either the traditional tax limits"9 or the more recent levy
limits."0 Their advocates contend that expenditure limits restrict the
capacity of local officials to expand budgets in response to interest
group and union pressures and that this will eventually result in a
lower level for all taxes."
II. DEBT CEILINGS AND TAX LIMITATIONS IN NEW YORK
A. THE FiANCuL AN PoL rcAL DILEMMA
The principal legal restraints on New York City finance are the
debt ceiling and the tax limitation imposed by the Constitution of the
State of New York. Under the state constitution, New York City may
not borrow in excess of ten percent of the five-year average full value
of real property within its boundaries."2 Nor may it impose real estate
taxes in excess of 2.5 percent of the five-year "average full valuation
of taxable real estate" within its boundaries." Moreover, the New
York State Legislature, pursuant to power granted by the state con-
stitution," has lowered the municipal tax limit in the past. 5
57. New Jersey enacted the first state government spending limit by statute in
1976. See note 55 supra. In Tennessee, a state government constitutional spending lid
was adopted by convention in November, 1977, and approved by the electorate in
March, 1978.' TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 24. In November, 1978, additional state govern-
ment expenditure limits were adopted by voters in Arizona, ARiz. CONsT. art. IX, §
17; Michigan, MIcH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 25-34; and Texas, TEx. CONsT. art. VIII, § 22,
Proposals for constitutional state spending limits were rejected by voters in Colorado
and Oregon. See Perry, supra note 50; J. Shannon, supra note 50, at app. A-7. See also
Perry & Hyatt, supra note 55.
58. For a general comparison of the philosophy behind and probable effects of
the 1978 tax and expenditure limits, see Shannon, A Fiscal Note, ITERGOVERNMENTAL
PERSPECTrE Fall 1978, at 24.
59. See notes 28-40, 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
61. See Perry & Hyatt, supra note 55. See also Peterson & Claxton, supra note
52, at 24; J. Shannon, supra note 50, at app. A-6.
Advocates of expenditure limits are critical of Proposition 13 and similar provi-
sions that limit only property taxes. See, e.g., TAX IaMrATION NEWS, Summer 1978,
at 2-3 (National Tax-Limitation Committee publication); Emshwiller, supra note 50.
62. N.Y. CONsT. art. VIII, § 4. For a brief history of this provision, see note 8
supra. Using the average of five years of assessments as the standard prevents sudden
fluctuations in the amount of allowable debt due to reassessments.
63. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII § 10 (a), (b), (f).
64. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10; id. art. IX, § 2.
65. For example, Acts of Mar. 25, 1953, chs. 204-205, 1953 N.Y. Laws 765, low-
ered the tax limitation for the City to 2.25 percent and provided that the rate would
be reduced to two percent should the City not agree to transfer its subway and bus
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It has often been argued that these limitations place the City on
the horns of a financial and political dilemma. On the one hand, New
York State has required the City to exercise substantial responsibility
for a vast array of public services not generally financed by other
American municipalities: mass transit, higher education, health care,
and courts." Moreover, New York requires its local governments to
make higher contributions to welfare programs than do other states."
Congress and federal administrators, in turn, have also skewed City
spending priorities through the use of categorical grants-in-aid for
systems to the New York City Transit Authority-a substantially independent agency.
This statute was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals. See Salzman v. Impellit-
teri, 305 N.Y. 414, 113 N.E.2d 543 (1953) (per curiam). For discussions of the Salzman
case and the detriment to home rule occasioned by conditioning local taxation power
on the transfer of functions, see Macchiarola, Local Government Home Rule and the
Judiciary, 48 J. URS. L. 335, 343 (1971); Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in
New York: I, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 598, 617-619 (1955).
66. See MUNICIPAL ASSISTANCE CORPORATION FOR THE CrrY OF NEw YORK, ANNUAL
REPORT 7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MAC REPORT]; Netzer, The Budget: Trends and
Prospects, in AGENDA FOR A CITY 651 (L. Fitch & A. Walsh eds. 1970). Of the major
American cities, only New York, the District of Columbia, and Baltimore maintain
dependent public school systems and provide major local support for welfare. Only
New York and the District of Columbia finance higher education in any significant
way. MAXWELL RESEARCH PROJECT ON THE PUsIC FINANCES OF NEW YORK CrrY, NEW
YORK CITY: ECONOMIC BASE AND FISCAL CAPACITY SUMMARY 15 (1973).
Other metropolitan areas use school districts, county governments, and special-
ized districts as well as the central city government to provide the services that the
City of New York provides by itself. Indeed, a report to Congress concluded,
If one compares the New York employment and spending patterns with those
of all the local governments providing services to the residents of other large
cities, New York appears to be less extraordinary . . . . [I]ts expenditure
on the services commonly provided by municipalities is not out of line with
those of other large cities.
U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, NEW YORK CITY'S FISCAL PROBLEM: ITS ORIGINS,
POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS, AND SOME ALTERNATIVE POLICY RESPONSES 15 (1975) (Back-
ground Paper No. 1) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFCE STUDY].
67. The federal grant-in-aid program requires states to provide matching funds
on the basis of a per-capita income formula. New York State was required to pay the
maximum of 50% for welfare programs. The state, in turn, required New York City to
pay one-half of its costs. TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON Crr FINAN cES, THE CITY IN TRANsi-
TION: PROSPECTS AND POLCmS FOR NEW YORE 45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TEMPORARY
COMMISSION]; City of New York, Official Statement of Aug. 25, 1978, at 61 (relating
to sale of $105,995,000 general obligation serial bonds) [hereinafter cited as Official
Statement]. Thus, New York City must pay up to 25% of its welfare costs and 50% of
the costs of the state home relief programs. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE STUDY,
supra note 66, at 13; Shalala & Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The New York Case,
1976 DUKE L.J. 1119, 1121. The average monthly benefit is $118 per person, with 85%
of the City's caseload receiving support from AFDC and the remainder receiving
state/local assistance in the form of home relief and veterans' assistance. Official
Statement, supra, at 61.
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social services that are accompanied by high matching fund and de-
tailed reporting requirements."5 In addition, the federal judiciary has
prohibited imposing residency requirements for the receipt of local
welfare benefits." All of these services, mandated by state and federal
law, must be financed by a single city government that is subject to
tax limitations more severe than thos6 applied to other local govern-
ments in New York State.70
It is by no means contended that the outside forces of intergov-
ernmental structure and demographic changes71 are the sole causes
68. The Temporary Commission on City Finances summarized the federal in-
volvement as follows:
[D]uring the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Federal grants grew
rapidly, achieving Depression-level proportions in state and local budgets.
The Great Society programs did not change the form of federal involvement
[financial aid and transfer payments but not administration], but they did
change its volume and purpose. Most of the grants awarded during the 1960s
were categorical grants in the areas of health, education, social services, and
environmental protection; they were awarded to states with no requirement
that states pass the funds on to localities. In almost all cases, the grants
required matching funds from the state government (or locality if the state
chose to pass on the funds), could be used only for narrowly defined purposes,
and carried with them complex administrative and reporting regulations. By
1969, the height of the surge in Federal grant programs, Federal grants-in-
aid provided over one-fifth of all revenues available to state and local govern-
ments.
TEMPORARY COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 47. See generally note 67 supra.
69. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
70. See Macchiarola, Local Finances Under the New York State Constitution
with an Emphasis on New York City, 35 FoReHAm L. REv. 263, 263, 282 (1965). It was
long ago noted that "[n]o adequate reason has ever been given for fixing the City's
tax limit [of 2.5 percent] far below the combined city-county-school district limits of
the other cities in the State, which range between 4 and 6 per cent of full value." STATE
OF NEw YORK TEMPORARY COMMISSION OF THE REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CON-
sTITUTION, STAFF REPORT No. 31, at 103 (1959) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT No.
31], quoted in Macchiarola, supra, at 284. See also STATE OF NEW YoRK TEMPORARY
COMMISSION ON THE REvIsION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, STAFF REPORT
No. 11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT No. 11]. But see C. HAMuss, CONSTI-
TurIONAL RESTRiCTIONS ON PROPERTY TAXING AND BORROWING PowERs IN NEW YoRK VIII-
4 to VfI-6 (1967) (because of New York City's broad borrowing powers, its effective
tax rate is higher than other cities; raising tax limit even higher would have detrimen-
tal effect on economy).
71. One recent report describes the association between intergovernmental and
demographic factors:
The intergovernmental system also has contributed to the socioecon-
omic transformation of New York City by providing incentives for money-
providers to leave the city (high taxes) and incentives for service-demanders
to remain or enter the city (high social service benefits). This, in turn, not
only caused further increases in Federal and State aid but also put even
greater pressure on the City's limited tax base, a pressure that other major
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of the New York City financial crisis. Some financial difficulties have
also been self-inflicted, through overextension of City government 2
and internal mismanagement, especially in the labor relations field. 3
The point is simply that the New York constitutional tax and debt
limitations have been ineffective tools for preventing local and state
officials from expanding the size and scope of local government and
may even have contributed to some of the inefficiencies in finance
and management. For example, long before the City's financial crisis,
at least one state report observed that the City's tax limit
has continued to restrict the City's financial operations forcing it to
continue to finance all of its capital improvements by borrowing and
thus to accumulate a large debt requiring inordinately large appro-
priations for debt service .... The tax limit also forced the City to
U.S. cities felt to a lesser extent because their state governments typically
assumed a larger share of all nonfederal program costs than New York.
TEMPORARY COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 59.
72. For example, the City University system long provided free tuition for any
city resident with a high school diploma and paid its teaching staff one of the highest
rates in the nation. Schnepper, New York City: A Short Term Solution, a Long Term
Plan, in New York City Financial Crisis: Hearings on S. 1883, S. 1862, S. 2372, S. 2514,
and S. 2523 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 218, 224 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Comm. Hearings]. Many
commentators feel the City should be relieved of this huge financial responsibility. See,
e.g., id.; Berger & Macchiarola, New York City's Budget-Looking into the Future,
N.Y.CrrY PERSPECTrIVE, Nov. 1974, at 1. Some financial relief was provided in Septem-
ber 1976, when the City University system revised its open admissions policy and
imposed tuition for the first time. Official Statement, supra note 67, at 61.
More generally, the Dean of the New York University Graduate School of Public
Administration has concluded that the present financial crisis requires the City to
shed some of its functions entirely, reducing its role to the provision of those
services that the city can effectively administer and finance, instead of at-
tempting selective reductions in service standards or in the rate of increase
of employee salaries .... All of this is to argue that if New York City seems
ungovernable, it is not because of the city's great size, but because the city's
government is too big in the sense that it does too many things.
Netzer, supra note 66, at 707-11. For further development of this argument, see Netzer,
Financing Urban Government, in THE MsrmopoirTAN ENIoM (J. Wilson ed. 1968);
Macchiarola, Decentralization-The Right Answer to the Wrong Questions?, N.Y.
Crry AFFAmS, Spring 1974, at 111; Netzer, Local Government in Heaven and Hell:
London vs. New York N.Y. CrTy Arrxms, Summer 1973, at 98; Horton, Still Afloat,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1976, § D, at 37, col. 2.
73. See generally New York City-What Lies Ahead?, 12 COLuM. J.L. & Soc.
PROs. 587-619 (1976) (symposium). For a comparison of labor negotiations under
Mayor Wagner and under Mayor Lindsay, see M. Gelfand, Decentralization-London
and New York, 76-86 (Trinity Term, 1974) (M. Phil. thesis, Oxford Univ.). The debt
limitations may, however, have had at least an indirect adverse effect on labor rela-
tions as well. See notes 113-15 infra and accompanying text.
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resort to various makeshifts in its financings and to impose some
uneconomic non-property tax levies.7'
B. EVASION OF THE DEBT CEILING
New York City, with the assistance of the New York Legislature,
has readily evaded the debt ceiling and increased its level of out-
standing debt above the ten percent limit set by the State Constitu-
tion. One technique, not properly characterized as evasion but having
the same practical effect, has been resort to special constitutional and
statutory exemptions. For example, the legislature is empowered by
the New York Constitution to exempt local government indebtedness
incurred for the construction of sewage disposal facilities,75 water sup-
ply facilities,7" or housing.7 In addition to these general exemptions
that apply to all municipalities in the state, special constitutional
provisions applicable only to New York City debt have exempted
$150 million for hospital bonds, $500 million for school construction,
and the debt incurred for acquisition of the transit system. 78 The New
York Legislature has also approved numerous statutory exclusions,
primarily to finance various aspects of subway system expansion.7'
The two principal means of direct evasion have been legislative
creation of special purpose authorities" and the City's misuse of tax
anticipation and revenue anticipation notes."
74. STAFF REPoRT No. 31, supra note 70, at 103, quoted in Macchiarola, supra
note 70, at 284. For a 1978 update, see Temporary Commission, supra note 67, at 59.
75. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 5(E).
76. Id. art. VIH, § 2.
77. Id. art. XVIII, § 4. This provision, by authorizing the legislature to permit
the City to incur debt up to two percent of the average assessed valuation of its real
property for housing construction, allows the City to borrow up to $781,667,936 outside
of the general 10% debt ceiling. As of July 1, 1978, $571,194,350 of this additional debt-
incurring capacity had been used by the City. Official Statement, supra note 67, at
86.
78. See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 7, 7a. For further discussion of these constitu-
tional exemptions, see Macchiarola, supra note 70, at 270-73.
79. For a description of some of these statutory exclusions, see Saltzman v.
Impellitteri, 305 N.Y. 414, 113 N.E.2d 543 (1953) (per curiam); Macchiarola, supra
note 65, at 343; W. Farr, Urban Government 250-51 (1974) (unpublished manuscript
on file with author).
80. Debt incurred by special purpose authorities is exempt from the general 10%
debt ceiling imposed by N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, because it is financed through
revenue bonds, see notes 87-91 infra and accompanying text, and serviced by user
charges and grants from other levels of government.
81. Such short-term borrowing can be serviced by property taxes that do not
count against the general 2.5 percent tax limit imposed by N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, §
10. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text. See generally S. SATO & A. VAN
ALTYNE, STATE AND LocAL GovERNmENT LAw 12-13 (1970).
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1. Special Purpose Authorities
New York City is by no means unique in employing special dis-
tricts to circumvent its constitutional debt ceiling. Just as financial
responsibility for capital investment was shifted from constitution-
ally restricted state governments to unrestricted municipalities dur-
ing the 1860s and 1870s, s1 it was later shifted to special districts and
authorities once constitutional debt limitations restricted the ability
of municipalities to finance the twentieth century demand for capital
development." This shift was facilitated by state court rulings, begin-
ning at the turn of the century, that special district borrowing was
not subject to the municipal debt ceiling, even when a special district
and a city had overlapping boundaries." Among the first such semi-
autonomous bodies were school districts." Later, other statutory au-
thorities-public corporations exempted from state and municipal
debt limits-were developed to build and operate revenue-producing
assets, such as bridges and toll roads, that tended to serve a limited,
fee-paying clientele."
Today, special districts and authorities finance, construct, and
operate a broad range of programs and facilities."7 Their costs are
financed by revenue bonds, which nearly always pay a greater rate
of interest than general obligation bonds." Empirical studies have
found interest rate differentials of between 0.25 and 1.25 percent for
comparable revenue and general obligation bonds. 8 This is because
82. See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text.
83. See generally U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
STATE CONsTIruTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LocAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 3, 23-
26, 53-59 (1961) [hereinafter cited as ACIR, RESTRICTIONS ON DEBT]; U.S. ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL
DEBT MANAGEMENT 21 (1965); D. MANDELKER & D. NrsCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 396-97 (1977); Morris, supra note 4, at 234-36.
84. See, e.g., Campbell v. City of Indianapolis, 155 Ind. 186, 57 N.E. 920 (1900);
Ex parte City of Newport, 141 Ky. 329, 132 S.W. 580 (1910); Robertson v. Zimmerman,
268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935). See also Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d 610,
331 N.E.2d 514 (1975), and cases cited therein.
85. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 18. New York City today does not share in this
particular form of debt limitation avoidance, since it is one of the few cities that still
finance their own school system. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
86. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 19.
87. See generally Quirk & Wein, A Short Constitutional History of Entities Com-
monly Known as Authorities, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 521, 587 n.387 (1971); Virtue, supra
note 19, at 295-96.
88. Quirk & Wein, supra note 87, at 569 n.286. In the present economic climate
there may be a few special authorities, with bonds backed by a strong revenue-
producing asset, that pay the same or lower interest rates as cities facing financial
crises.
89. See, e.g., ACIR, RESTRICTIONS ON DERT, supra note 83, at 55-56 (local bonds
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the risk to investors is generally greater with revenue bonds, since
debt service on revenue bonds is derived from user charges and grants
by other levels of government, 0 rather than from the real estate taxes
that back general obligation bonds issued by general purpose local
governments."
While there may be certain economic advantages in separately
incorporating agencies to operate collateral services or structures that
can be financed by revenue bonds and user charges, 2 commentators
agree that special districts and authorities have principally been
employed to increase capital expenditure without exceeding state
and municipal debt limits. 3 In this avoidance process municipalities
for water supply and sewer systems-0.5-0.6% differential); A. HEms, supra note 2, at
45-50 (state government general obligation and revenue bonds); O'Donnell, The Tax
Cost of Constitutional Debt Limitation in Indiana, 15 NAT'L TAX J. 406, 410 (1962)
(school building corporation bonds); Tyler, Revenue Bond Financing: Advantages and
Disadvantages, 32 MUNIcWAL FINANCE 76, 78-79 (1959). See also Mitchell, supra note
1, at 28-31 (discussing these and other studies on interest differentials). The financing
costs added by these higher interest rates can total many millions of dollars over the
life of the revenue bond. Id. at 31.
90. For example, the New York City Transit Authority regularly receives funds
from the City's capital budget, and sometimes from its operating budget. See J. RAPPA-
PORT, PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY 5 n.5 (1975) (report prepared
for the State Charter Revision Commission for New York City).
91. The Council of State Governments has described authority financing as fol-
lows:
Public authorities are authorized to issue their own revenue bonds, which
ordinarily do not constitute debt within the meaning of constitutional debt
limitations .... They lack the power to levy taxes, but are empowered to
collect fees or other charges for the use of their facilities, devoting the result-
ing revenue to payment of operational expenses and to interest and principal
of their debt.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIC AuToarmos IN THE STATES 3 (1953). On the
more recent development of authority revenue bonds also bolstered by the state's
"moral commitment," see Griffith, "Moral Obligation" Bonds: Illusion or Security? 8
URa. LAw. 54 (1976).
92. When a project produces insufficient external economies for the general pop-
ulation of taxpayers, it may be desirable to impose the burden of maintenance upon
its users and shift the risk of project failure to its bondholders, even if such an approach
requires paying the latter a higher interest rate to compensate for the higher risk. See
generally A. HENs, supra note 2, at 56-60; Mitchell, supra note 1, at 23-24. Moreover,
special authorities have the additional advantage of overcoming jurisdictional barriers,
so as to provide public services, especially transportation or sewerage, on a regional or
interstate basis. See, e.g., J. RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 1; Brooks, The Metropolis,
Home Rule, and the Special District, 11 HAsTINGs L. J. 110, 126 (1959).
93. See, e.g., J. BoLLENs, SPECIAL DISTRICT GovERNMENTs IN THE UNrrED STATES
7-9 (2d ed. 1961); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 22-24; Quirk & Wein, supra note 87, at
585-96; Virtue, supra note 19, at 289-94; note 83 supra. Mitchell's elaborate empirical
study ranks all states in the continental United States in terms of degrees of restrictive-
ness for public borrowing and then compares this ranking to the overall amount of
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have received substantial assistance from both the federal and state
governments. 4 There has been a massive expansion in special author-
ity revenue bond debt financing since World War II.1
As in other states with constitutional limits on governmental
borrowing, New York State and its localities have made substantial
use of special authorities and districts. In the 1938 New York Consti-
tution, an attempt was made to end this abuse by imposing severe
restrictions on the formation and operation of special authorities."6
Yet, this method of financing has continued, particularly for services
provided within the boundaries of New York City. The Transit Con-
struction Fund, for example, was established in 1972 to finance capi-
tal improvements in the transit system." Within two years, scheduled
expansions were estimated to exceed $2 billion, to be provided by
federal, state, and city funds.98 A more complicated arrangement is
employed for the construction of higher education facilities by the
general obligation and "non-guaranteed" (revenue bond) debt in each state. The pro-
cess is then repeated in terms of degrees of restrictiveness for local governments.
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 21, 50-52.
94. Particularly during the depression of the 1930s, the federal government of-
fered financing for employment-producing construction projects to cities that had
already accumulated debt close to their constitutional ceilings. State legislatures, in
turn, created special purpose districts and authorities with power to incur debt outside
the limitations their constitutions imposed upon general purpose state and local gov-
ernments. See J. RAPPAPoRT, supra note 90, at 1; Quirk & Wein, supra note 87, at 567
n.279. See generally Robertson v. Zimmerman, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935)
(upholding statutory creation of Sewer Authority for City of Buffalo, which was too
near its debt limit to provide adequate facilities).
95. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 17-22, 26-27. In particular, the 1968 to 1978 period
was very active, with revenue bonds moving from 42% of new issues to 60% by the end
of that decade. An Illusory Lightening in the Debt Load, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 16, 1978, at
103 [hereinafter cited as Illusory Lightening].
96. The state legislature may not impose liability for special authority debt on
the states or local governments. N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 5. Moreover, the state constitu-
tion prohibits, with some exceptions, the gift or loan of state credit, id. art. VII, § 8,
or of local government credit, id. art. VIII, § 1, and tax exemptions are repealable. Id.
art. XVI, § 1. As two astute commentators have noted:
It is probably fair to say that the authority system cannot survive under such
restraints. . . .It may be asked, why, in light of the constitutional re-
straints, is there outstanding in New York today some $6.5 billion of author-
ity debt [two and one-half times the outstanding State debt]? The answer
is simple-the constitution has been ignored.
Quirk & Wein, supra note 87, at 579 n.347.
97. See N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW 99 1225-a to -b. (McKinney Supp. 1978). The fund
is administered by the New York City Director of the Budget and two mayoral appoint-
ees. Id. §§ 1225-b, -e.
98. A. ScmcK, CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES UNDER THE NEW YORK Crry CHARTER 54
(1974) (report prepared for the State Charter Revision Commission for New York City);
W. Farr, supra note 79, at 252.
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State Dormitory Authority," which receives annual rental payments
from the City University Construction Fund (CUCF) to cover debt
service, overhead, and administration.' The City of New York, in
turn, is responsible for one-half of these rental payments.'0 ' As a
result, although $27.9 million in annual rental payments to the CUCF
are reflected in the City's current Expense Budget,102 $564.7 million
of outstanding Dormitory Authority debt for facilities leased to the
City are not charged against its debt limit. 0 Thus, by using these two
legislatively created authorities to finance construction, the City has
incurred no "debt" within the meaning of the New York Constitu-
tion. It has, however, substantially expanded its capital investments
and assumed liability, through continuing lease payments,'04 for debt
service on those investments.'" The City has similar long-term lease
arrangements with the Urban Development Corporation for com-
munity facilities and housing.'"
99. N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 1675-92 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1978). See Win-
dalume Corp. v. Rogers & Haggerty, Inc., 36 Misc. 2d 1066, 1067, 234 N.Y.S.2d 112,
114 (1962) (purpose of authority is to free projects it undertakes from restraints other-
wise applicable to state government projects).
100. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6276 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1978).
101. Id. at § 6279. The state pays the remainder. Id. While the City is technically
liable only to the extent of its funds actually available for lease payments, should it
fail to make a payment, that amount would be deducted from state aid to the City
and transferred directly to the Dormitory Authority. See Official Statement, supra
note 67, at 97-98.
102. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CITY OF NEW YORK, ADOPTED
BuDrET-IscAL YEAR 1979, at 84E (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1979 CITY BUDGET].
This represents an increase over the fiscal 1978 appropriation, which was $23 million.
Id.
103. Official Statement, supra note 67, at 98, 102. See generally A. SCHICK, supra
note 98, at 55.
104. Lease payments to the City University Construction Fund (CUCF) will be
made from the Expense Budget in fiscal 1979, see note 102 supra and accompanying
text, but the City is also authorized to borrow to meet these annual payments. A.
ScHIcK, supra note 98, at 55. While the City has exercised this power to capitalize in
the past, see 1979 CITY BUDGET, supra note 102, at 20C-21C (reflecting $6.66 million of
prior authorization in the capital budget for earlier CUCF projects), it does not plan
to continue the practice in the future. See id. (no planned appropriation for these or
other CUCF projects in the projected Capital Budgets for fiscal years 1979 through
1982).
105. This is not an uncommon arrangement. The long-term leasing of property
from statutory authorities or from private parties has been employed by cities in
several other states to avoid constitutional debt limitations. See Magnusson, Lease-
Financing by Municipal Corporations as a Way Around Debt Limitations, 25 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 377, 389 (1957), Mitchell, supra note 1, at 21; Nichols, supra note 2, at
411-14.
106. Approximately $64.1 million of Urban Development Corporation debt re-
lates to facilities leased to the City for 40 years, none of which is counted against the
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In addition to avoidance of the City's debt limitation, the semi-
autonomous operation of special authorities may lead to a reduction
in both City revenue and political accountability. Revenue is lost
because the City does not receive the charges imposed by special
authorities upon their users."07 In this respect, an authority operates
more like a private corporation than like a City agency. Unlike pri-
vate corporations, however, special authorities are exempt from City
real estate and income taxes."8 While the City has been able to nego-
tiate payments "in lieu of taxes" with several authorities, "monies
received do not always bear a relationship to the current assessed
valuation" of property owned or income produced by the authori-
ties. ' Moreover, some public authorities receive direct subsidies
City's debt limit. The estimated annual rental is $5.2 million. Official Statement,
supra note 67, at 97-98. See also A. ScHIcK, supra note 98, at 55.
107. This is clearest in the case of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority
(a subsidiary of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority), which operates seven
bridges, two tunnels, an air terminal, and an exhibition hall-garage-office complex (all
within the City's borders) on a profitable basis. J. RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 16-17,
app. A at xi. There is now statutory authorization for the transfer of this operating
surplus to the deficit-producing New York City Transit Authority (also a subsidiary
of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority). N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAw § 1219-a (Me-
Kinney 1970 & Supp. 1978). In fact, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority
transferred $74.3 million in 1972, on the basis of an agreement with its bondholders to
increase their interest rate by one-quarter of one percent, J. RAPPAPORT, supra note 90,
at 38, and is scheduled to finance $24 million worth of Transit Authority projects
during fiscal 1979. See 1979 Crry BuDGr, supra note 102, at iiC, ivC, 113C. There is
still, however, no authorization to transfer any authority's surplus to the City's Reve-
nue Budget.
108. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAw §§ 566 to 566-a (McKinney 1970) (Tribor-
ough Bridge and Tunnel Authority); Id. § 1216 (New York City Transit Authority);
Id. § 1275 (Metropolitan Transportation Authority); Id. §§ 1981-1982 (Battery Park
City Authority); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6459, 6562, 6611, 6635, 6776, 6971 (McKin-
ney 1979) (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey); Id. § 6272 (Urban Develop-
ment Corporation). See generally Bush Terminal v. City of New York, 282 N.Y. 306,
26 N.E.2d 269, 16 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1940).
109. J. RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 11-12. This is because their enabling acts
generally forbid public authorities to pay more in lieu of taxes than the amount last
paid as taxes on their real property prior to its acquisition by the authority. See, e.g.,
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6971 (McKinney 1979) (Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey); id. § 6276 (Urban Development Corporation industrial projects). Thus, in-lieu
payments reflecting the substantial additional assessed value of real estate improve-
ments made by the authorities cannot be made. An exception exists for World Trade
Center office space leased to private companies engaged in international commerce,
on which the Port Authority "may" agree to pay more. Id. J 6611. See generally J.
RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 11-12, 18, 40.
It is noteworthy that authority-owned real estate, although exempt from taxes,
was carried on the City's tax rolls for many years. In the 1977 fiscal year, publicly-
assisted housing and City-owned properties assessed at a total of $978 million were
finally removed from the tax rolls. Additional City-owned properties, assessed at $53
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from the City." ' Thus, many profitable enterprises are conducted by
special authorities with no provision for transfers to the City; yet the
City is required to underwrite the deficits produced by other authori-
ties.
Perhaps more significant, though less visible, than the tax loss
suffered by the City or the direct subsidies it pays to special authori-
ties is the dispersion of political authority created by their semi-
autonomous operations. The difficulty of coordinating planning,
housing, and transportation policy among a multiplicity of special
and general purpose local governments within the same geographic
area has long been a staple of public administration literature."' This
political dispersion also has significant economic implications. In
addition to increasing the cost of debt financing,"' the authority sys-
tem may have contributed to high municipal employee wage rates in
New York City. As the Temporary Commission on City Finances
million, and Urban Development Corporation properties, assessed at $160 million,
were removed in fiscal 1978. Nevertheless, the City estimates that $250 million of
publicly owned properties remain on the tax rolls. Official Statement, supra note 67,
at 50, 52. Including such exempt property on the tax rolls was an additional means of
avoiding constitutional debt and tax limits. See notes 135-37 infra and accompanying
text.
110. The principal recipients of subsidies are the New York City Transit Author-
ity and the New York City Housing Authority. The City is required to pay the Transit
Authority $51 million plus interest on the latter's anticipation notes, in ten equal
annual installments from 1972 to 1981. N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 1207(2) (McKinney
1970 & Supp. 1978). If these payments are not made, the State Comptroller is in-
structed to deduct the payments from state aid apportioned to the City. Id. The City
also has an agreement with the Transit Authority to pay for new subway cars at an
additional $5.1 million per year until November 1, 1987. Official Statement, supra note
67, at 102. See generally N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 1207-k (McKinney 1970). The City's
fiscal 1979 Capital Budget contains a total of $474.5 million for the Transit Authority.
Although federal, state, and Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority grants supply
the majority of these capital funds, $65.3 million is derived from the City's own reve-
nue. 1979 Crrv BUDGET, supra note 102, at iiC, 113C.
The City has also guaranteed $136 million of debt issued by the New York City
Housing Authority. This amount is chargeable against its constitutional debt ceiling.
Official Statement, supra note 67, at 97-98. In addition, the City has guaranteed
repayment of $468.3 million of Housing Authority debt to the State of New York, id.
at 98, besides providing substantial subsidies to cover Housing Authority operating
expenses and debt service. Id. at 100.
111. See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMMIsSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
GOVERNMENT, STRucTuRE, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING IN METROPOLrAN AREAS (1961);
J. BOLT ENS & H. SCHMANDT, THE MEmopous, 141-82 (1965); COMrrrEE ON ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, RESHAPING GOVERNMENT IN METROPOLrAN AREAS (1970); J. GOTTMANN,
MEGALOPOLIS (1961); S. GREER, GOVERNING THE METROPOLIS 45-58 (1962); W. SAYRE &
H. KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CrrY 320-43 (paperbound ed. 1965); R. WOOD, 1400
GOVERNMENTS (1961); Leiper, Rees & Kaabak, Mobility in the City: Transportation
Development Issues, in AGENDA FOR A CITY 377 (L. Fitch & A. Walsh eds. 1970).
112. See text accompanying notes 87-91 supra.
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found, "[e]ach independent agency operating under the State sys-
tem. . could formulate its own bargaining position with respect to
its employees without regard for the overall labor policy of the
City.""' In contrast to this lack of coordination among public em-
ployers, public employee unions relied on a "pattern bargaining"
strategy so that a contract negotiated with one body, whether an
authority or a City agency, became a model for other unions in their
later negotiations with the City."' Thus, the labor relations policy of
the City government has been heavily influenced by actions of public
authority officials who have no direct political accountability to City
voters and who, in some cases, are not even appointed by the
mayor." 5
113. TEMPoRARY CommissioN, supra note 67, at 77. Statutory authorities may
choose to be within either the New York state labor relations system, regulated by the
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Taylor Law), N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw, §§ 200-
214 (McKinney 1973), or the New York City system, regulated by the New York City
Collective Bargaining Law, N.Y. CrrY CHARTR ch. 54 (Williams 1976 & Supp. 1978).
See N.Y. Crry ADmIISTRATivE CODE § 1173-4.0(c) (Williams 1975). The principal dif-
ferences are in the composition of the independent administrative board and the scope
of bargaining permitted. Administrative determinations in the state system are ren-
dered by a three-member Public Employment Relations Board appointed by the Gov-
ernor, N.Y. CIv. SEar. LAw § 205(1) (McKinney 1973), while comparable determina-
tions for the City system are made by the Board of Collective Bargaining (composed
of two "labor" members appointed by the Municipal Labor Committee, two "city"
members appointed by the mayor, and three "impartial" members selected by the
labor and city appointees), and the Board of Certification (composed of the three
"impartial" members of the Board of Collective Bargaining), N.Y. Crry CHARTER §§
1171-1172 (Williams 1972). The Taylor Law also permits collective bargaining on a
much broader range of subjects. Compare N.Y. Civ. SEnv. LAw § 203 (McKinney 1973)
with Exec. Order No. 52 (Mayor of City of New York), Sept. 29, 1976 (quoted and
discussed in Note, The Taylor Law, the OCB and the Public Employee, 35 BRooKLYN
L. REv. 214, 224-28 (1969)).
114. For example,
[t]he settlement between the Transit Authority and the Transport Workers
Union, Local 100, in the spring of 1974-providing for a two-year contract
with a 14 percent rate increase plus a cost-of-living formula-has provided
the basis for most settlements between the City of New York and its civil
service unions in 1974.
R. HORTON, REFORMWG THa MUNiciPAL LABOR REATIONS PROoRSS iN NE w YORK CrrY
18 (1975) (report prepared for the State Charter Revision Commission for New York
City). Although all subway lines (237 miles) and bus routes (934 miles) operated by
the New York City Transportation Authority are within the city limits, city govern-
ment has little practical control over the Transit Authority's labor or other policies
See J. RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 27-29, app. A at vi; note 115 infra.
115. For example, all eleven members of the Metropolitan Transportation Auth-
ority-who, sitting ex officio, comprise the Board of Directors of the New York City
Transit Authority-are appointed by the Governor, although three must be nominated
by the Mayor. See N.Y. Pun. AuTH. LAw §§ 1201, 1263 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1978).
Similarly, the three-member Board of the Battery Park City Authority is entirely
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2. Tax Anticipation and Revenue Anticipation Notes
A unique borrowing abuse involved the City's misuse of tax an-
ticipation notes (TANs)"' and revenue anticipation notes (RANs)." 7
The purpose of these short-term borrowing devices was to bridge the
temporary cash flow gap between expenditures, which must be made
on a daily basis, and revenues (taxes and intergovernmental aid),
which are received only on a quarterly or yearly basis."' If repaid
within the permissible statutory period,"' TANs and RANs are ex-
cluded from the New York Constitution's article VIII debt limit.
2 0
City officials abused these exempted short-term debt instruments by
borrowing "in increasing amounts against accrued, but actually un-
collectable, tax revenues."'' Some "anticipated" real estate tax reve-
nue was uncollectable because tax exempt properties were, and con-
appointed by the Governor, despite the fact that its operations are exclusively within
the City's boundaries. See N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAw § 1973 (McKinney 1970). Moreover,
the New York City mayor cannot appoint members to many of the public authorities
exercising regional or statewide jurisdiction, even though most have a substantial
impact on the City. See J. RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 21, 27-29.
116. Tax anticipation notes are
short-term municipal notes which are sold in advance of receiving some
specific taxes such as real estate taxes.. . . Such notes are secured by taxes
collected during the current fiscal year or by taxes receivable for the preced-
ing four fiscal years. . . . These notes permit the municipality to borrow
against expected tax receipts in order to fund current operating expenses.
Greenberg, supra note 19, at 347. See N.Y. LOCAL F. LAw § 20.00(a)(4) (McKinney
1968 & Supp. 1978) (authorization); id. §§ 24.00-.10, 39 (regulations). See also id. §
11(a)(36)(a) (McKinney 1968)(providing a five-year "period of probable usefulness"
for temporary financing in anticipation of the collection of real property taxes and
assessments); note 147 infra and accompanying text.
117. Revenue anticipation notes "are issued .... in anticipation of the collec-
tion of rents, charges, taxes (other than real estate taxes), and other revenue or moneys
to be received (1) for utility or other services rendered by the municipality or (2) from
the state or the federal governments." Greenberg, supra note 19, at 348. See N.Y.
LOCAL FIN. LAW § 20.00(a)(5) (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1978) (authorization); id. §§
25, 39 (regulations). See also id. § 11(a)(36)(b)-(c) (McKinney 1968) (providing a
three-year "period of probable usefulness" for temporary financing in anticipation of
utility charges, non-property taxes, and some state and federal grants, and a five-year
period for other grants); note 147 infra and accompanying text.
118. See CONGREssioNAL BuDGET Omca STUDY, supra note 66, at 5; Shalala &
Bellamy, supra note 67, at 1124 & n.19. See generally Official Statement, supra note
67, at 89-90.
119. RANs, including annual renewals, may not "extend beyond the close of the
second fiscal year succeeding the fiscal year in which such notes were issued," N.Y.
LOCAL FiN. LAw § 25.00(f) (McKinney 1968), and a TAN, including annual renewals,
must be retired not later than five years after the date of its original issuance. Id. §
24.00(a)(6).
120. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 5(A).
121. MAC REPoRT, supra note 66, at 7.
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tinue to be, carried on the City's tax rolls.'2 Moreover, although the
tax delinquency rate for privately-owned property was seven percent,
non-paying landowners were retained on the records used in formu-
lating estimates of "anticipated" real estate taxes. ', These two de-
vices, in violation of standard accounting procedures, resulted in an
overestimate of the income likely from current taxes, thus enabling
the City to issue more TANs than could be repaid from revenue
actually received.' 2 Similarly, the city issued substantial amounts of
RANs against overstated estimates of "anticipated" federal and state
aid. ' These unsupported TANs and RANs had to be refinanced,
becoming gradual accretions to the City's permanent debt, unregu-
lated by the constitutional debt ceiling. 126
As a result of the ad hoc exemptions, the refinancing of short-
term excluded debt, and the availability of federal and state capital
funds, only fifty-eight percent of the City's fiscal 1979 Capital Budget
is covered by the ten percent debt ceiling.'12 The same pattern pre-
vails when total outstanding debt is considered. The City currently
has $6,827.9 million of outstanding long-term debt and $4,236.2 mil-
lion of outstanding short-term debt, but only $6,231 million is
122. See note 109 supra.
123. See generally, 2 MooDy's INVESTOR SERVICE, MUNmIPAL & GOVERNMENTAL
MANuAL 2511 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MOODY'S].
124. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS IN
SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK To THE SuBcoMMiT, ON ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
OF THE COMMTTEE ON BANKnG, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAinS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TivES, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ch. 2, at 27-30 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as
SEC STAFF REPORT].
125. Id. ch. 2, at 18-23. The amount of outstanding RANs grew from $420 million
on June 30, 1970 to $2.56 billion on June 30, 1975. Id. ch. 2, at 22. The State Comptrol-
ler reported "the City had included as accounts receivable substantial amounts that
were not collectible or where the likelihood of collection was extremely remote." Office
of the New York State Comptroller, Prior Year Accounts Receivable, Managerial Sum-
mary 3 (July 3, 1975) (quoted in SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 124, ch. 2, at 19).
126. See Shalala & Bellamy, supra note 67, at 1124-25 & n.21. According to the
Municipal Assistance Corporation: "Once on the treadmill, the city had to continue
borrowing, in order to pay off previous debts and to finance new deficits. To market
this growing debt, both higher interest rates and shorter maturities were required."
MAC REPORT, supra note 66, at 7.
127. The 1979 Capital Budget authorizes $1,511 million of new construction. Of
this, only $875.6 million is covered by the general debt limit. See 1979 CITY BUDGT,
supra note 102, at iiC. Constitutionally exempt financing (housing, sewage disposal
and water supply facilities), see notes 75-77 supra and accompanying text, accounts
for $116.5 million; the remaining $519.6 million is supplied prizharily by federal grants.
See 1979 CITY BUDGET, supra note 102, at iiC. This is by no means a new development.
One governmental study reported that "barely half of the capital improvements pro-
posed by the City Planning Commission for 1973-74 [were] covered by the constitu-
tional debt limit." A. ScHIcK, supra note 98, at 55.
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charged against the City's general debt ceiling. 1' In overall terms,
this means that New York City's current outstanding debt is not ten
percent of the full value of taxable real property, as mandated by the
art. VIII, § 4 general debt ceiling, but rather is 13.8 percent.2 9
C. AvomANCE OF THE TAX LIMrrAON
As noted above, the New York Constitution establishes a general
real estate tax limit for New York City of 2.5 percent of the average
full valuation of taxable real property. 3 Real estate taxation at this
level would have produced only $1.3 to $1.7 billion per year for the
City during the 1973 through 1977 period, or between eleven and
seventeen percent of the City's actual Expense Budget liability.'3' To
128. Official Statement, supra note 67, at 78, 86. Thus, only 56.3% of the City's
total outstanding debt is covered by the constitutional ceiling. Another way of measur-
ing the extent of New York City borrowing is to add the long-term debt of the City
and the long-term debt of the Municipal Assistance Corporation (which currently
holds all short-term City debt). The total is $11,934.3 million, compared to only $6,231
million covered by the City's general debt ceiling. Id. at 92.
Since all figures here and in the text are for outstanding debt, they do not include
$550.6 million in bonds and notes held in City sinking funds. Id. at 87-88, 92. For
figures on gross long and short-term debt, see MooDy's, supra note 123, at 2514-16.
129. Full valuation of New York City taxable real estate is $86,646.9 million for
the 1979 fiscal year. Official Statement, supra note 67, at 50. When total long-term
City and Municipal Assistance Corporation debt is taken as the base, see note 128
supra, the ratio of debt to full value of taxabie real property becomes 13.8%. Official
Statement, supra note 67, at 93. This debt ratio, however, does not include the massive
borrowings authorized by the statutory authorities that operate in New York City. See
notes 102-06 supra and accompanying text.
130. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
131. The following table summarizes New York City's potential annual tax yields
for fiscal years 1973-1977 and their relation to the Expense Budget:
Ratio of
column 1 to
Fiscal Year [column 1] [column 2] column 2
Taxation at 2.5% Expense Budget (percentage)
of full value (billions)
(billions)
1973 1.49 9.40 16
1974 1.68 10.16 17
1975 1.34 11.10 12
1976 1.56 13.63 11
1977 1.70 13.58 13
The figures in column 1 are taken from Official Statement, supra note 67, at 48. The
Figures in column 2 for fiscal 1973 through fiscal 1975 are taken from MOODY'S, supra
note 123, at 2511, while the column 2 figures for fiscal 1976 and fiscal 1977 are from
Official Statement, supra note 67, at 14.
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enable the Expense Budget to rise to its current level, the City has
undercut, or avoided by various devices, the general 2.5 percent tax
limitation. The result has been an average City tax levy of 3.68 per-
cent of full valuation for the years 1972 through 1979.11
One of the most important deviations from the 2.5 percent limit
is authorized by the New York Constitution itself, which exempts real
estate taxes imposed by local governments for debt service.13 This
provision has consistently been invoked to justify increased taxes for
debt service on the City's massive short and long-term borrowing.
During fiscal years 1972 through 1979, the debt service levy consti-
tuted an incredible 46.8 percent of the City's total real estate tax
levy. 134
The overall level of real estate taxes has also been increased by
including in the computation of "full value of taxable real estate"
certain property that cannot realistically be taxed. Despite the re-
moval of a substantial amount of exempt real property from the tax
rolls during the last two fiscal years, 135 an estimated $568 million of
publicly-owned property remains.131 Although this property is not
held for a "public use" and thus is technically subject to the property
tax, the City, as it freely admits, "is unable to collect taxes from
itself.' ' 37 Insofar as such property is included in the calculation of
132. This figure is an average derived from the annual levy rates contained in
Official Statement, supra note 67, at 49.
133. [T]he amount to be raised by tax on real estate in any fiscal year,
in addition to providing for the interest on and the principal of all indebted-
ness, shall not exceed an amount equal to the following percentages of the
average full valuation of taxable real estate of such county, city, village or
school district, less the amount to be raised by tax on real estate in such year
for the payment of the interest on and redemption of certificates or other
evidence of indebtedness ....
N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the legislature may not
restrict the power of local governments to impose debt service levies. Id. at § 12.
Historically, the debt service levy has been computed as the amount necessary to
pay principal and interest on the City's long-term debt and interest on its short-term
debt for the immediate fiscal year. Official Statement, supra note 67, at 47.
134. This figure is an average derived from the annual figures contained in Offi-
cial Statement, supra note 67, at 48. The highest percentages were during the crisis
years of 1975 and 1976: 58.6% and 54.0% respectively. The lowest percentage in recent
years was 34.5% in 1970. See id.
135. See generally note 109 supra.
136. This figure represents the estimated full value of publicly-owned property
currently on the tax rolls. It was calculated by multiplying thp City's own estimate of
the property's assessed value, $250 million, see Official Statement, supra note 67, at
50, 52, by the full value/assessed value ratio of 2.27. That ratio was derived from 1979
estimates of assessed and full values of the taxable real estate within the City. See id.
at 50.
137. Official Statement, supra note 67, at 50.
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constitutionally permissible tax revenue, the rate of taxation to be
applied to privately-owned property is permitted to exceed the levels
contemplated by the constitutional limitation.
A third means of undercutting the principal purpose of the New
York tax limitation (to restrict the burden imposed on landowners),
while staying within its structure, has been to increase property val-
uations.M Even though the same rate is applied, both the burden on
the taxpayer and the revenue of the local government are increased.131
Moreover, the limit has been side-stepped by the adoption of
corporate and personal income, sales, and user taxes. ' Though many
of these taxes, such as the sales tax,"' draw upon a wider population
than just New York City landowners, their primary effect is to in-
crease the residential homeowners' burden. Others, such as commer-
138. See Macchiarola, supra note 70, at 268-70 (describing early criticisms of this
potential evasion).
139. This form of evasion can be prevented either by freezing assessments while
maintaining tax rates, see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art XIII A, §§ 1, 2, or by automatically
readjusting tax rates after reassessments are conducted. See ACIR, TAx AND ExPENui-
Tma LiMITs, supra note 32, at 14 (levy limits). See also Shannon & Weissert, After
Jarvis: Tough Questions for Fiscal Policymakers, INTERGOVERNMwETAL PERSPECTrIVE,
Summer 1978, at 11 (describing the Florida procedure).
140. The City imposes a vast array of taxes, including resident and non-resident
personal income taxes, business income taxes (general and special corporations, off-
track betting, and utility), a retail sales tax, special sales taxes (stock and bond
transfers, real property and mortgage, and gasoline), and special use taxes (motor
vehicle, vault, hotel room occupancy, general occupancy, and commercial rent). See
generally MOODY'S, supra note 123, at 2512-13; Macchiarola, Constitutional, Statutory
and Judicial Restraints on Local Finance in New York State, 15 N.Y.L.F. 852, 862-63
(1969). These non-property taxes are currently budgeted to produce $3.16 billion, as
compared to $3.14 billion from general property taxes. 1979 CITY BUDGET, supra note
102, at i. Although this is the first year in which non-property taxes will surpass real
estate taxes, they have not been far behind in recent years. The figures for fiscal 1978
are $3.17 billion (general property taxes) and $3.01 billion (other taxes). Id. In fiscal
1977, City real estate taxes produced $3.24 billion and other taxes produced $3.06
billion. See MOODY's, supra note 123, at 2513; Official Statement, supra note 67, at
148.
141. The City was empowered, by N.Y. TAx LAw § 1201 (McKinney 1975), to
levy a four percent sales tax up until July 1, 1975. The tax was administered, collected,
and distributed to the City by the State Tax Commission. See id. § 1210 (McKinney
1975 & Supp. 1978). Since that date, the state has collected the City's sales tax
primarily for the purpose of discharging the annual debt service and operating expen-
ses of the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC). See N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW § 3036
(McKinney Supp. 1978); N.Y. STATE FiN. LAW § 92-d(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978). After
these expenses are accounted for, the remainder of the sales tax revenue is transferred
to the City. See id. § 92-d(3)(ii). See also Official Statement, supra note 67, at 54.
The sales tax produced $867 million in fiscal 1977. See id. at 14. The City's balance
sheets include this total as income in the Revenue Budget and then deduct, in the
Expense Budget, the $5 million devoted to MAC expenses as "MAC withholdings for
debt service." See id. at 14-16.
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cial rent and general occupancy taxes,' clearly affect owners of com-
mercial property within the City.
Finally, the City has evaded, or at least avoided, the constitu-
tional tax limit by shifting current Expense Budget items to the
Capital Budget, that is, by using borrowed funds earmarked for capi-
tal projects to finance operating expenses that would otherwise be
met by raising taxes. The amount of recurring operating expenses
financed by the Capital Budget grew from an estimated $100 million
in 1966, to over $500 million by 1974,11 then to $719 million by fiscal
1978.'1" The City's Four Year Financial Recovery Plan' requires Cap-
ital Budget financing of expense items to be phased out by fiscal
1982.146
To understand the process of capitalizing expenses, it is neces-
sary to examine the applicable constitutional, statutory, and City
Charter language. Section 2 of article VIII of the New York State
Constitution provides, in part, "No indebtedness shall be contracted
for longer than the period of probable usefulness of the object or
142. These two taxes produced $205,121,000 in fiscal 1977. MooDY's, supra note
123, at 2513. For a description of how they are calculated, see id. at 2515; Official
Statement, supra note 67, at 56.
143. A. SCHICK, supra note 98, at 47. Another report places the total amount of
capitalized expenses for fiscal years 1965-1975 at $2.434 billion. See SEC STAFF REFORT,
supra note 124, ch. 2, at 66-70. There has been money in the Capital Budget to finance
these recurring expense items only because the devices for evading the debt ceiling
have been so successful. See notes 79-129 supra and accompanying text.
144. See 1979 CrY BUDGET, supra note 102, at 1. The City contends that $58
million of this total is properly included in the Capital Budget under the New York
State Comptroller's directives. Official Statement, supra note 67, at 16, 31.
145. For details of the recovery plan, see MAC REPORT, supra note 66, at 12;
Shalala & Bellamy, supra note 67, at 1129; Official Statement, supra note 67, at 5-11,
19-34.
146. The Recovery Plan limits transfers from the Capital to the Expense Budget
to $445 million in fiscal 1979, $300 million in fiscal 1980, and $150 million in fiscal 1981.
No such transfers are to be made in fiscal 1982. Official Statement, supra note 67, at
32. See also N.Y. Pus. AuTH. LAW § 3038(5) (McKinney Supp. 1978) (allowing until
fiscal 1988 to eliminate the transfers). The City plans to finance those capitalized
expenses which remain during the phase-out period through the issuance of $900 mil-
lion of City or MAC bonds, if the necessary legislative approval can be obtained.
Official Statement, supra note 67, at 32. The Expense Budget gap created by the
phase-out of capital financing is to be filled through direct aid and welfare reform by
the federal government, revenue sharing and full financing of senior colleges by the
state government, and workforce and public assistance reductions by the City. See id.
at 21-22.
There has, however, already been a deviation from the scheduled phase-out. The
Recovery Plan has been amended to allow the transfer of $524 million from the Capital
to the Expense Budget in fiscal 1979, rather than the $445 million originally called for
in the Recovery Plan. See 1979 CrrY BUDGET, supra note 102, at ii; Official Statement,
supra note 67, at 19, 23.
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purpose for which such indebtedness is to be contracted, to be deter-
mined by or pursuant to general or special laws, which determination
shall be conclusive." The state legislature has seized on this broad
grant to assign "period[s] of probable usefulness" to various expense
items, thereby authorizing their inclusion in the City's Capital
Budget."7 In 1965, for example, the legislature gave the City special,
one-time-only authorization to issue budget notes for the City's cur-
rent contributions to the employee pension fund."' The City financed
its 1971 labor settlement with the police and firemen by a short-term
loan; it was also given legislative authorizaton to borrow up to $100
million over a five year period to balance its 1972-1973 Expense
Budget."9 In furtherance of this process, the City's Corporation Coun-
sel had denominated certain recurring programs as "capital" ex-
penditures, despite section 211 of the City Charter, which designates
only traditional physical improvements as "capital projects."'' 0
Local officials may obtain three major benefits by using the Cap-
ital Budget rather than the Expense Budget to finance current opera-
tions. The political advantage is that current expenses are paid from
borrowed funds, so taxes for repayment are deferred. 5' In New York
City, however, because this type of borrowing has generally involved
short-maturity securities, debt service has required increased taxa-
tion almost immediately. 152 A second advantage is the possible availa-
bility of federal subsidies for local capital projects. The income tax
exemption of interest on municipal bonds, which allows their interest
147. See generally N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1968) (29 pages of
legislative determinations of periods of probable usefulness).
148. Act of June 23, 1965, ch. 440, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1229; N.Y. CITY AnMIN. CODE,
§ C51-10.0. Cf. Acts of June 30, 1975, chs. 322-325, 1975 N.Y. Laws 455 (McKinney)
(pension and retirement contributions of Buffalo, Rochester, and Yonkers have a
"period of probable usefulness of three years" and can be financed by budget notes).
149. STATE STUDY COMMISSION FOR NEW YORK CITY, FINAL REPORT 30 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as STATE STUDY Comm'N REPoRT]; W. Farr, supra note 79, at 239.
150. See STATE STUDY Comm'N REPORT, supra note 149, at 30. The New York
State Legislature or the City Corporation Counsel, or both, have approved the transfer
of the following items to the Capital Budget: relocation assistance for welfare clients,
job training programs, leaseback and rental payments, routine park maintenance,
vehicle maintenance, and salaries for many staff personnel of the City Planning Com-
mission and the Bureau of the Budget. See MAC REPORT, supra note 66, at 7; A.
SCHICK, supra note 98, at 93-95; Netzer, supra note 66, at 654. Even before this process
reached such epic proportions, one report accused the city of "borrowing for purposes
for which no big city should borrow, and for some purposes for which no city, big or
small, should borrow. ... ." N.Y. STATE COMMISSION ON GovEmNmEr OPERTIONS OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CrrY IN TRANSrION 6 (1960).
151. This, of course, is a gross violation of intergenerational equity. See note 25
supra and accompanying text.
152. Netzer, supra note 66, at 712 n.2.
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rate to be lower than the taxpayer's actual rate of return on his or
her investment, provides an indirect subsidy to local government
borrowers."' More direct are federal subsidies in the form of matching
fund grants," ' which have paid the major portion of many local gov-
ernment capital projects. These matching funds have, however, de-
creased in recent years, and very little is likely to be available for
operating expenses."5 A final advantage of capitalizing operating ex-
penses is avoidance of the constitutional tax rate limit. As noted
above, while the New York Constitution restricts City real estate
taxes to 2.5 percent, real estate taxes imposed to cover debt service
are exempt from this overall limit."' By swelling the Capital Budget
with items formerly in the Expense Budget, the City can impose more
real estate taxes (for debt service) without running afoul of the tax
limitation.
In its present form, therefore, the New York constitutional tax
rate limitaton has been ineffective in restraining either the actual
level of real estate taxation, currently a full 1.18 percent above the
established limit, 5 or the overall tax burden, which has greatly in-
creased."' Moreover, the devices that have been employed for evad-
ing the tax limit, particularly capitalization of current expenses, have
themselves produced detrimental economic consequences.
D. LESSONS DERIVED FROM THE NEw YORK Crry EXPERIENCE
The New York City fiscal crisis demonstrates that the prevalent
form of constitutional debt and tax limitations are ineffective in re-
straining borrowing and taxing by a large city faced with a declining
tax base, mandated expenses, demands for increased public services,
and union pressures. Not only were numerous mechanisms devised
by New York City officials to evade or avoid the limits; the state
153. See B. BrrrKn & L. STONE, FEDERAL INcoME, ESTATE AND GiFr TAxATION
177-78 (4th ed. 1972); Greenberg, supra note 19, at 339-40 and sources cited therein.
This advantage for municipalities is of less significance now that interest rates on
municipal bonds have soared.
154. Accepance of such federal grants in aid, however, requires the City, in
commiting its matching funds, to follow the spending priorities of the federal govern-
ment. Moreover, federal agencies and departments impose organizational, policy, and
administrative requirements for the receipt and maintenance of these categorical
grants. See generally TE'oRARY COMMSSION, supra note 67, at 47; Goetcheus, State
House and National Capitol, in GOVERNING THE CrrY 68, 70-72 (R. Connery & D.
Caraley eds. 1969); M. Gelfand, supra note 73, at 54, 64.
155. See Netzer, supra note 66, at 664.
156. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
157. See generally note 132 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 140-142 supra and accompanying text. See generally C. HAmuss,
supra note 70.
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legislature also assisted by providing necessary authorization for spe-
cial exemptions, statutory authorities with separate debt incurring
capacity, questionable accounting practices, and capitalization of
operating expenses.
The New York experience parallels that of other cities"' and
states. Constitutional debt limits have not restricted the amount of
state and local debt issued. They have merely changed the composi-
tion and increased the cost of state and local capital investment
financing.' Likewise, both the real estate tax rate level and the
overall tax burden have increased substantially despite the existence
of constitutional tax limits.' Moreover, neither the debt ceiling nor
the tax limit has prevented the substantial expansion of local govern-
ment operations.' 2 We turn now to an examination of a device more
finely tuned to controlling governmental expansion-the spending
limit.
III. SPENDING LIMITS IN ARIZONA
Arizona was the first state to adopt a local government expendi-
ture limit.' Interestingly, its ten percent spending limit initially was
developed by the Arizona Supreme Court,"' which saw it as the logi-
cal corollary of the ten percent levy limit."' A spending limit of ten
159. Cleveland's fiscal crisis has also received substantial attention in the press.
See, e.g., Oh Cleveland, NEwswEm, Jan. 1, 1979, at 18. Although the magnitude of
that crisis is less and its development somewhat unique, many of the New York City
lessons have been taught there as well. In particular, the inadequacy of tax and debt
limitations to prevent fiscal mismanagement has been demonstrated.
160. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 28-29.
161. In other states as well, it is the existence of alternative local tax sources
(sales or income tax), not the existence of a real estate tax limit, that produces revenue
diversification and decreased reliance upon the property tax. See ACIR, TAX AND
EXPENDrruRE Limrrs, supra note 32, at 4, 22.
162. See generally id. at 3, 21-22 (reporting empirical research showing that
although local tax limits are associated with lower local own-source per capita expendi-
tures, their existence does not affect total state-local expenditures).
163. For discussions of developments under the Arizona system, see ARIZONA
ADvisoRY COUNCIL ON INTERGOvERNMENTAL RELATIONS, Rxv.sEs PR ,IMAWARY HIsToRiCAL
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFEcTS OF ARIzONA'S TEN PERCENT BUDGET LIMITATONS ON ALL COuN-
TIES AND SExcTED Crrms AND TowNs (1975) [hereinafter cited as ARiz. HIsToRIcAL
ANALYSIS]; Koon, Living with Limits, Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1978, at 1, col. 1. For detailed
analysis of its current operations, see LEAGUE OF ARIZONA CrrmEs AND TowNs, ARIZONA'S
BUDGET LAW FOR Crrms AND TowNs (1976) [hereinafter cited as LEAGUE SUWMARY];
LEAGUE OF ARIZONA Cmxs AND TowNs, MUNICIPAL BUDGET AND FINANCE MANUAL (1976)
[hereinafter cited as LEAGUE FNACE MANUAL].
164. Southern Pac. Co. v. Yuma County, 19 Ariz. 211, 168 P. 507 (1917).
165. The current version of the 10% levy limit is ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-301
(Supp. 1978). For a general consideration of levy limits, see notes 42-48 supra and
accompanying text.
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percent allowable annual increased for local budgets was codified in
1921.166 The contemporary version provides,
C. . . . [N]or shall the total of amounts in the budget [of the
county, city or town] proposed for expenditure exceed by more than
ten per cent the total of amounts proposed for expenditure in the
budget adopted for the previous fiscal year, excluding expenditures
for school, bond, special assessment and district levy, primary, gen-
eral or special election purposes, municipal cemeteries, the amount
of increase in salaries of public officials whose salaries are set by
state law, or municipal utility undertaking as defined in § 9-521.
D. No expenditures shall be made for a purpose not included
in such budget, and no expenditure shall be made, nor debt, obliga-
tion or liability incurred or created in any fiscal year in excess of the
amount specified for each purpose in the budget for such fiscal year
as finally adopted except when authorized under and pursuant to
the provisions of § 42-308 [emergency situations], whether or not
the county, city or town has at any time received, or has on hand,
funds or revenue in excess of those required to meet expenditures,
debts, obligations, and liabilities incurred under such budget."7
When examined closely, the experience of Arizona localities with
spending limits strikingly parallels that of New York City with its
debt ceiling and tax limits: relatively easy avoidance of the terms and
undercutting of the purpose of the limit. A recent study reveals that
only 41.4 percent of expenditures by Arizona counties and 44.5 per-
cent of expenditures by Arizona large cities and towns are covered by
the ten percent limit.6 8 A variety of avoidance devices have been
employed. As with the New York debt limit,"6 9 an increasing number
of services have been specially excluded from Arizona's expenditure
limit."' As a result, fifty-eight percent of county expenditures and
166. Act of Mar. 5, 1921, ch. 52, §§ 2-3, 1921 Ariz. Sess. Laws 87. For further
discussion of the history of Arizona's local government expenditure limit, see ARiz.
HISTORICAL ANALYsIs, supra note 163, at 1.
167. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-303(C)-(D) (Supp. 1978).
168. ARIz. HISTORIcAL ANALYSIS, supra note 163, at 6 (percentages are for the 1973
fiscal year). This study focused on the effects of the budget limit and levy limit upon
Arizona's 14 counties, its 13 cities over 10,000 population, and 10 of its smaller cities
and towns. Id. at 3.
169. See notes 76-131 supra and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1598(1) (1976) (monies distributed to
local governments from the highway user revenue fund, derived from gasoline tax);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-302(D) (Supp. 1957-1978) ("expenditures for school, bond,
special assessment, district levy, primary, general or special election purposes, munici-
pal cemeteries, hospitals of a municipal corporation, the amount of increase in salaries
of public officials whose salaries are set or limited by state law"); Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-306(E) (Supp. 1978) (monies in public works reserve fund, derived from a property
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fifty-five percent of city and town expenditures were exempted.' In
addition, general increases in the expenditure base were permitted on
an ad hoc basis for particular years-for cities in 197212 and for cer-
tain localities in 1977 and 1978.' 3 Because of the formula used for
calculating future limits, the establishment of such a new expendi-
ture base will have effects for many years.
An increase in spending above the ten percent limit is permitted
when the Arizona Tax Commission determines that a particular local
government is faced with a fiscal emergency. 17 Although probably
inserted to provide needed flexibility in the system, 175 this override
device has been abused by localities that purposely overbudget and
then routinely obtain approval from the Tax Commissioner for their
planned "fiscal emergencies."''
Since certain budget items are statutorily exempt,7 7 the expend-
iture limitation encourages shifting of budgeted expenditures from
controlled functions to those that are uncontrolled by simply making
an accounting transfer.'78 One aspect of this technique involves the
tax of up to $3.8 million, to be used for local public construction, improvements, and
land acquisition). See generally LEAGUE FIN~AcE MANUAL, supra note 163, at 13-15.
171. ARiz. HISTORIcAL ANALYsis, supra note 163, at 8. See also note 168, supra.
172. See Act of May 11, 1972, ch. 130, 1972 Ariz. Sess. Laws 684. See generally
Koon, supra note 163. This is the functional equivalent of New York's numerous ad
hoc, one-time-only, authorizations of debt exemptions, see notes 78-79 supra and ac-
companying text, and of authorizations for capitalizing individual expense items. See
notes 147-50 supra and accompanying text.
173. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-303.03 (Supp. 1978). See generally Koon,
supra note 163.
174. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-308(A) (Supp. 1978)
In event of epidemics, disease or acts of God which result in damage or
disaster to the works, roads, buildings or property of a county, city, or town,
or which menace the life, health or property of any considerable number of
persons therein, or in event of any other emergency the results of which have
not been anticipated in the budget and which will require making expendi-
tures or incurring liabilities or expenses by reason thereof during the current
fiscal year, and restricted to instances in which no other funds have been
provided or appropriated therefor, the governing body may present to the
state board of tax appeals in writing the facts thereof which require making
such expenditure or incurring such additional liability or expense during the
fiscal year and therein specify the amount which is deemed necessary there-
for.
175. Similarly, TANs were made available to solve New York City's cash flow
problem but were then abused by its financial managers. See notes 116-126 supra and
accompanying text.
176. Koon, supra note 163. In fact, "Ithere are municipalities in the state of
Arizona which ask for this emergency relief each fiscal year." LEAGUE SUMMARY, supra
note 163, at 4.
177. See notes 167-71 supra and accompanying text.
178. ARiz. HISOTacAL ANALYsis, supra note 163, at 9.
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use of federal funds179 to expand the revenue budget in particular
areas. For example, federal funds are spent on police salaries,5 0 and
money that would otherwise be used for police salaries is transferred
out of the controlled budget into an exempt category and spent on
other items.18 As a result, Arizona's localities have developed frag-
mented accounting records, involving numerous fund accounts, re-
flecting controlled and exempt budget items1 2 which are the func-
tional equivalents of New York City's elaborate accounting systems
used to circumvent its tax and debt limits.1 8
Given the array of categorical, ad hoc, emergency, and account-
ing exceptions to the expenditure limit, it is not surprising that Ari-
zona city and county total expenditures virtually quadrupled be-
tween fiscal 1962 and fiscal 1973,184 despite that state's ten percent
spending limit. Thus, like New York tax and debt limits, the Arizona
spending limit'has not restricted local government expenditures but
has merely channeled the directions they have taken.
IV. TOWARD A BETTER SYSTEM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FINANCIAL CONTROL
In light of New York City's experience with avoidance of consti-
tutional tax and debt limitations and that of Arizona with statutory
expenditure limits, policymakers in New York, Arizona, and other
states may wish to reconsider the effectiveness of the various means
available for furthering the goals of lightening the burden on current
taxpayers,1 5 limiting local government debt so as to restrict the bur-
den on future taxpayers, 8 and restraining the growth of local govern-
179. If a principal purpose of spending limits is to restrict the size of local govern-
ments, then it can be argued that federal revenue-sharing funds should be included in
the controlled budget. Arizona has, however, placed them in the exempt category. The
legitimacy of this practice was submitted to the Arizona Attorney General in 1978,
Koon, supra note 163, but no opinion has yet been issued.
180. Traditional local government services, such as police and fire protection, are
the most heavily controlled by the Arizona expenditure limit.
181. Koon, supra note 163.
182. Asuz. HISTORICAL ANALYsis, supra note 163, at 9. For a detailed description
of accounting procedures employed in Arizona, see LEAGUE FINANcE MANUAL, supra
note 163. For a general discussion, see LEAGUE SUMMARY, supra note 163, at 3-4.
183. See notes 116-26, 135-37, 143-46 supra and accompanying text.
184. ARiz. HIsToicAL ANALYsIs, supra note 163, at 7. Expenditures for Arizona
cities and towns for fiscal 1973 were 60% higher than they would have been in that
year had they been actually limited to a 10% annual growth rate from their fiscal 1962
level. Fiscal 1973 county expenditures exceeded a 10% annual growth rate by 36%. Id.
185. This is the primary purpose of constitutional tax limits, see notes 32-36, 40
supra and accompanying text, and especially of Proposition 13 and its progeny. See
notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
186. This is the purpose of constitutional debt ceilings. See notes 21-24 supra and
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ment.1sl There are four principal alternatives available for imposing
such limitations. The first involves readjusting debt ceilings and tax
limitations to reflect the current realities of municipal taxation. This
could be accomplished, for example, by taking into account the entire
revenue base available to local governments rather than just the
value of real property. Similarly, spending limits could be adjusted
to take into account factors, such as inflation, that require increased
governmental expenditures. At the same time, these more realistic
limitations might be strengthened to prevent the avoidance tech-
niques discussed in Sections II and III above. A second alternative is
to replace the yearly overall tax and debt limits with a system that
requires voter approval of each large capital project or each tax incre-
ment. A variation on this theme would allow voters to override consti-
tutionally established tax, debt, and spending limits. Third, consti-
tutional debt limitations could be repealed, so that the amount of
local government debt incurred is controlled by market and political
forces. If constitutional tax and spending limitations were also re-
moved, local voters and state legislatures would have to provide a
political brake upon city hall excesses. The final alternative involves
creation of a state or local administrative oversight agency responsi-
ble for monitoring and controlling taxation, spending, and debt in-
cursion by local governments.
A. THE OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES
In order to evaluate the comparative advantages and disadvan-
tages of each of these four alternatives, it is necessary to consider
certain general principles that should be reflected in any local govern-
ment financial system, whatever the details of its operation.
1. Providing More Information-Mandatory and Voluntary
Disclosure
Like any other economic entity, a local government must com-
pile accurate information and make it available in a fashion that is
intelligible to the relevant decisionmakers.' In the case of local gov-
ernments, the recipients of this information are state and city offi-
cials, investors, market managers, and voters. Several bills currently
and recently before Congress have attempted to apply this principle
accompanying text.
187. This is the immediate purpose of expenditure lids, see notes 59-61 supra and
accompanying text, and a secondary purpose of constitutional tax rate limits. See note
51 supra and accompanying text.
188. See Lodal, Improving Local Government Financial Information Systems,
1976 DUKE L.J. 1133, 1141.
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by mandating greater disclosure by issuers of municipal securities.'S'
Although a detailed analysis of these bills is beyond the scope of this
Article, '10 they embody three basic approaches. The first requires
municipal securities issuers to comply with the comprehensive regis-
tration and disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933' in
the same manner as issuers of corporate securities."12 Another treats
municipal securities differently from corporate securities but still
requires disclosure. '93 The third relies on the anti-fraud provisions of
189. See, e.g.* H.R. 2724, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2339, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977); S. 2969; 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 2574, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975);
[hereinafter cited as H.R. 2724, S. 2339, S. 2969, and S. 2574, respectively].
190. A vast literature has already developed on the subject. See, e.g., Johnson
& Wheeler, Securities Law Duties of Bond Counsel, 1976 DuKE L.J. 1205; Neugebauer,
Municipal Securities: Disclosure Requirements, 9 URB. LAw. 305 (1977); Petersen,
Doty, Forbes & Bourque, Searching for Standards: Disclosure in the Municipal Securi-
ties Market, 1976 DuKE L.J. 1177; Note, Federal Securities Fraud Liability and Munic-
ipal Issuers: Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1064
(1977); Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities: A Constitutional and Statu-
tory Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1261 [hereinafter cited as Federal Regulation]; Note,
State Sovereignty's Impact on Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities, 7 GOLDEN
GATE L. REv. 577 (197.7) [hereinafter cited as State Sovereignty's Impact]; Note, The
Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities Issuers: Applying the
Test of National League of Cities v. Usery, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 982 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Constitutionality]; Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities: Disclo-
sure Requirements and Dual Sovereignty, 86 YAlE L.J. 919 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Dual Sovereignty].
191. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5-10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77j (1976).
192. See, e.g., S. 2574, supra note 189 (Eagleton Bill). Essentially, this bill would
amend § 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976), to remove
the current exemption afforded to municipal securities. Municipal issuers would be
required to file a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) before offering a new issue to the public, and would be subject to the Act's civil
liabilities. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 k(a)-(g), 77 1 (1976).
This would include the possibility of being subject to a stop order by the SEC. See
Securities Act of 1933, § 8(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b) (1976).
193. For example, the Williams-Tower Bill, S. 2969, supra note 189, encouraged
state regulation of municipal issuers, but would have imposed federal disclosure guide-
lines in the absence of such state regulation. It required that municipal issuers with
more than $50 million in outstanding debt prepare various annual reports and distribu-
tion statements, to be made available to all investors. Unlike the Eagleton Bill, see
note 192 supra, the Williams-Tower Bill would not have required a registration state-
ment to be filed with the SEC prior to a securities offering by a local government.
Federal Regulation, supra note 189, at 1275. It would, however, have added Section
13A, entitled "Municipal Securities Full Disclosure of 1976," to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976). This new provision would have demanded
preparation of annual reports and distribution statements and would have permitted
the SEC to require filing at a repository open to public inspection. See State Sover-
eignty's Impact, supra note 189, at 588. The Williams-Tower Bill was revised some-
what, expanded, and reintroduced as S. 2339, supra note 189, by Senators Williams,
Proxmire, and Javits in the fall of 1977. The new bill is described in detail in Securities
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the securities acts"' that are already applicable to municipal securi-
ties."'
Although these proposed disclosure requirements would impose
substantial new costs on local government taxpayers"6 primarily for
the benefit of investors, the information, once developed, could also
easily be made available to state regulatory agencies and voters.'
Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that imposition of
disclosure requirements by the federal government should be
avoided,' 8 because of the movement since the New York City crisis
& Exchange Commission, Final Report, In the Matter of Transactions in the Securities
of the City of New York, 16 SEC DocKET 951, 957-58 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Final Report].
The Williams-Tower Bill contained little new with regard to civil liability for
fraud. See generally notes 194-95 infra. On the other hand, the more recent revision
supplants the implied private right of action under the anti-fraud provisions with an
express right of action for initial purchasers who meet fairly strict procedural and
substantive burdens and establishes "reasonableness" defenses for issuers and under-
writers. S. 2339, supra note 179, at § 13A(g)-(j); see SEC Final Report, supra, at 957-
58.
194. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)-(b) (1976); Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). See also Employment
of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
195. See generally Petersen, Doty, Forbes & Bourque, supra note 190, at 1194-
97; State Sovereignty's Impact, supra note 190, at 583-84; SEC Final Report, supra
note 193, at 954-55 n.5 (citing recent SEC-initiated anti-fraud actions against munici-
pal securities professionals). The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
29, § 3(2),(5), 89 Stat. 97, 101 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(9), (29) (1976)),
specifically exempt issuers of municipal securities from furnishing more information
than is currently required under the anti-fraud provisions, i.e. reports that are already
generally available. See also SEC Final Report, supra note 193, at 955 & n.8.
The difficulty with this approach is that the antifraud provisions mandate no
specific level of disclosure; they merely create a retrospective claim for damages. Thus,
they neither ensure a flow of information nor prevent the purchase of a worthless
municipal security. See State Sovereignty's Impact, supra note 190, at 583-84. One
bill, H.R. 2724, supra note 189, seems to overcome this criticism. It would employ the
antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act as the enforcement mechanism for new municipal
disclosure guidelines that would be issued by the SEC under a broad statutory man-
date. For further discussion of H.R. 2724, see Dual Sovereignty, supra note 190, at 930-
39.
196. According to some authors, the additional costs imposed might even be
considered in evaluating the constitutionality of some of the pending bills. See note
200 infra. If taxpayers do not directly bear the cost of supplying municipal financial
information, however, it must be borne by investors, who will, presumably, demand a
higher interest rate to cover the cost of investigation or the risk of uninvestigated
municipal securities.
197. For example, the Williams-Tower Bill would have authorized the SEC to
require the deposit of mandated reports and statements in a central repository or other
location which is open to the public. See note 193 supra.
198. Historically, municipal issuers were excluded from the federally mandated
disclosure requirements applicable to corporate issuers because there had been little
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toward voluntary disclosure by local government issuers.'" Moreover,
some of the pending bills may face constitutional obstacles in light
of National League of Cities v. Usery.2 °°
fraud in the sale of their securities. Municipal bonds were generally considered good
investments, and it was believed that taxpayers should be spared the cost of high
disclosure standards. See Federal Regulation, supra note 190, at 1261-63.
199. See, e.g., Petersen, Doty, Forbes & Bourque, supra note 190. The survey
discussed in that article relied on a sampling of documents (official notices of sale,
offering statements, or prospectuses) accompanying debt issue offerings of approxi-
mately 150 local governments in 1975 and 1976. The two sample periods were compared
to determine the way in which voluntary reporting practices improved in response to
the market environment evolving during that period. The analysis sought to capture
short-run reactions to the disclosure problem, focusing on the municipalities' adjust-
ment of old procedures to meet newly perceived and still uncertain requirements in
the market. Id. at 1182-97. But cf. SEC Final Report, supra note 193, at 959 (because
voluntary disclosure measures "have not been uniformly adopted," and because such
measures "may deteriorate in periods of stress, . . . reliance upon purely voluntary
efforts at improvement is not an adequate response to the need for increased investor
protection").
The voluntary disclosure that has occurred came primarily in response to what
municipalities perceive as an increased demand by investors for more relevant infor-
mation. Peterson, Doty, Forbes & Bourque, supra note 190, at 1181. In 1975, banks held
46.1% and property and casualty insurance companies owned 15.4% of the outstanding
municipal securities. Id. at 1181 n.17. These large institutional investors possess suffi-
cient market leverage to force disclosure of data they consider important. Id. at 1181.
In addition, market underwriters and bond counsel are likely to demand more compre-
hensive disclosure as their own risk of liability increases. See Federal Regulation, supra
note 190, at 1270-74. Although the duty of brokers, dealers, and bond counsel to
investigate generally does not extend beyond a survey of information which is available
to the public, as more information is disclosed voluntarily in response to market pres-
sures, these three market managers will have more information to investigate and will
therefore have an expanded scope of liability. Id.; Johnson & Wheeler, supra note 190,
at 1209. Moreover, states have begun to increase the duties of market managers to
investigate. See Doty, Municipal Disclosure-Recent Developments II, 10 URB. LAW.
vii, xii-xiv (1978); Neugebauer, supra note 190, at 330-37.
The exemption of broker-dealers in municipal securities from the requirements
imposed on broker-dealers in corporate securities was removed by the Securities Act
Amendments of 1975. The SEC now has discretionary power to survey registration
applications and may deny a permit to deal in municipal securities based upon a
finding that the applicant has not met certain requirements or has committed prior
violations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)(2)(B) (1976).
200. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Whether the federal government has intruded on state
sovereignty is determined by how "essential" the regulated activity is to the separate
and independent existence of the states. If a court determines that the regulated
activity is essential, it must then decide whether the interfering federal regulation
imposes large financial burdens on the state and whether it interferes with the state's
freedom to carry out these essential activities. If the regulation does either, it will be
invalidated unless justified by a substantial federal interest. See Constitutionality,
supra note 190, at 1006. Several commentators have predicted that the Williams-
Tower Bill would pass the test set forth in National League of Cities, since it gives the
states the option of formulating their own disclosure policies, see note 193 supra, does
[Vol. 63:545
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE
2. Providing Better Information
In addition to external disclosure requirements, a local govern-
ment financial information system, like that of a private corporation,
must serve the internal purposes of planning, control, and manage-
ment."1 In order to fulfill these disparate goals, "a city must have a
single, integrated budget and accounting system, with one set of
codes and one set of official financial reports on which all can
agree."2 2 Recognizing this need, several states have enacted, or are
in the process of enacting, mandatory guidelines for municipal book-
not interfere with local policy determinations, and imposes only moderate costs on
municipalities. See State Sovereignty's Impact, supra note 190, at 593; Constitution-
ality, supra note 190, at 1020.
The Eagleton Bill would, however, probably be deemed in violation of state sover-
eignty, because it gives the SEC authority to refuse a municipal issuer a permit to
make an initial distribution of its securities. Such federal control over the borrowing
power of state and local governments would probably violate the National League of
Cities test. Furthermore, the cost of compliance with the registration provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 may be prohibitive, and the Supreme Court may find that
alternative means of mandating the necessary disclosure would be less intrusive. See
Federal Regulation, supra note 190, at 1310-19; State Sovereignty's Impact, supra note
190, at 614-16. For a more comprehensive discussion of other local government ramifi-
cations of National League of Cities, see Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New
Federalism: Preliminary Reflections on the Roles of Local Government Actors in the
Political Dramas of the 1980's, 20 B.C. L. REv. (1979) (forthcoming).
201. Lodal, supra note 188, at 1136-40. More specifically, planning requires the
presentation of the overall costs for each program rather than merely an agency cost
breakdown; control requires obligations to be checked against appropriation balances;
management requires evaluation of the efficiency with which specific activities are
performed, measurement of revenue collections against projections, and cost account-
ing of expenditures. Id.
202. Id. at 1147. More specifically,
The key to the solution is a system of basic classifications which can catego-
rize each dollar amount handled by the system according to a set of rigor-
ously defined independent characteristics. Each budget, revenue expense, or
balance sheet transaction should have a set of independent codes which
classifies the dollar amount associated with the transaction in many differ-
ent ways. For example, an expenditure from the General Fund (fund) for
office supplies (object of expenditure) for the prenatal care program
(activity) for the Public Health Department (organizational unit) would
receive independent codes for each of these attributes, plus, of course, other
classifications as well. Using this type of scheme, it is possible to produce
reports showing, for example, summaries of all expenditures for office sup-
plies in the general fund, or all expenditues for the prenatal program, or all
expenditures for the Public Health Department, or any combination of these.
Not only is the rigidity of the traditional system avoided, but by making each
code represent only one characteristic, the confusion and ambiguity of the
kind of system which has troubled New York City can also be eliminated.
Id. at 1143 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 1147-48.
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keeping and accounting.2 3 Oregon, for example, now requires issuers
of obligations in excess of one million dollars to follow disclosure
guidelines" 4 promulgated by the Municipal Finance Officers Associa-
tion.215 Michigan requires municipal finance systems to comply with
"generally accepted auditing standards. ' 200 While such a statutory
standard raises certain problems,0 ' had New York City reports fol-
lowed it, they could not have mixed different accounting bases nor
repeatedly concealed the City's ever mounting deficit.2 0
203. See Doty, supra note 199, at xii-xiv. See also SEC Final Report, supra note
193, at 956, 959-60 (suggesting that state efforts have been fairly limited and calling
for federal legislation to standardize reporting methods for accurate, understandable
information).
204. OR. REV. STAT. § 287.018 (1977).
205. The Municipal Finance Officer Association (MFOA) is a professional organ-
ization composed of finance directors, budget officers, and auditors from state and
local governments, as well as certified public accountants. Its focus is on governmental
accounting, budgeting, and reporting, which it pursues through regular meetings,
newsletters, journals, and research reports. MFOA helped to establish the National
Council on Governmental Accounting, which has prepared the widely adopted "blue
book" on "generally accepted accounting principles" (GAAP) as applied to govern-
ment. NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON GoVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING, GoVEwRNMENAL AccouNT-
ING, AuDrTING, AND FINANcL L REPORTING (1968); see Lodal, supra note 188, at 1152 &
n.37. See also SEC Final Report, supra note 193, at 955 & n.9 (citing three recent sets
of MFOA disclosure guidelines for municipal securities).
206. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 141.427(1) (1976). A similar result is obtained by
requiring city councils to designate a qualified accountant to conduct an independent
audit in accordance with GAAP. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 17-105 to -106
(West 1978). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-3,-45,-51 (1976) (requiring both disclosure
and independent auditing in accordance with uniform principles).
States attempting to regulate local government accounting practices need not be
restricted to the "blue book" standards developed by the National Council on Govern-
mental Accounting. See note 205 supra. Although other national groups, such as the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, are oriented toward developing accounting standards for private
businesses, .they also publish guidelines for governmental accounting. See S. DAVIDSON,
J. SCHINDLER, C. STICKNEY & R. WEIL, FINANCIAL AcCOUmNTIG 20-21, 163, 486-87 (1976).
207. The generally accepted accounting principles standard forbids consolidated
reports of various funds, gives inadequate attention to planning and management of a
government accounting system, and provides inadequate guidance as to the treatment
of federal grants. See Lodal, supra note 188, at 1152-53. Moreover, allowing a private
agency to set such important governmental standards may raise questions of unlawful
delegation in some states.
208. Id. at 1152. See also Supplemental Staff Report, 16 SEC DocKEr 960, 960-
61 (appendix to SEC Final Report, supra note 193). The City, under the guidance of
the Emergency Financial Control Board, is required by state law to have its expense
budget balanced in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles for fiscal
1982 and subsequent years. Act of June 2, 1978, ch. 201, § 25, 1978 N.Y. Laws 391.
See Supplemental Staff Report, supra, at 971. For a discussion of the present devia-
tions from GAAP in New York City reports, see Official Statement, supra note 67, at
160.
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In short, not only more data, but also better data is essential for
effective municipal financial management. An increase in readable
information about municipal finance would tend to protect investors,
restore voter confidence, encourage governmental responsiveness,
and allow for better allocation of governmental resources.2°' In addi-
tion, improved financial reporting would probably induce increased
voter demand for greater local government fiscal responsibility. 10 For
example, California's open and easily understandable budget system
made that state's surplus more visible to the public, thus fueling
demands for a substantial tax decrease.2 11
3. Balancing Flexibility and Stability
If municipal governments are to remain stable and retain any
future options with respect to financial affairs, their overall debt level
must be restricted to some extent. Although local governments pos-
sess a theoretical ability to tax property, and often income, within
their borders at extremely high rates, both voter reaction and fear of
business relocation impose restraints, even in the absence of constitu-
tional restrictions. Determinations regarding how much leverage is
possible and by whom restraints should be imposed may depend on
local political, economic, and social conditions, but avoidance of ex-
cessive debt is an economic necessity for the long-term stability of
local governments. At the same time, any debt ceiling should be both
high and flexible enough to permit municipalities to exploit unique
opportunities (such as federal capital funds at favorable matching
rates or temporary reductions in interest rates) and to respond to
genuine emergency situations.
4. Fulfilling Responsibilities as a Political Entity
In addition to these informational and economic factors, which
have parallels in the financial systems of private industry, a local
government financial system, because it is part of a governmental
entity, must reflect certain other basic principles. Primary among
209. See generally Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities, 60 MINN.
L. REv. 567 (1976); SEC Final Report, supra note 193, at 959-60.
210. For this reason, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
has repeatedly proposed various full disclosure devices, including indexing income
taxes to the inflation rate, disclosing the effects of reassessments upon tax levies, and
reimbursing local governments for state-mandated increases. Such devices would in-
form the public of the government unit or official that should bear the responsibility
for tax and spending increases. See ACIR, TAx AND EXPENDrruE Lm rs, supra note
32, at 6-7; Shannon & Weissert, supra note 139, at 8, 9-10.
211. See Lipset & Rabb, supra note 51; The California Tax Derby, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 29, 1978, at 16, col. 1.
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these is the concept of intergenerational equity,212 a principle that
should pervade all local government taxing, spending, and debt fi-
nancing policies. Moreover, a local government's financial policies,
like other governmental activities in our society, should be responsive
to the needs and demands of its citizens. How best to assure such
political responsiveness has been, and will likely remain, a subject of
intense political debate. One traditional approach is to allow elected
local representatives at the level of government closest to the people
to make financial decisions for the municipality-fiscal home rule. 23
Another method permits local voters to exercise a direct voice in such
decisions through referenda. On the other hand, some argue that local
government financial affairs are so intertwined with those of the state
that the state-wide constituency must be consulted to provide ade-
quate political responsiveness. 211
These principles of increased and improved information, stabil-
ity, flexibility, intergenerational equity, and political responsiveness
form the basis for an evaluation of alternative means of reforming
local government financial systems.
B. REFORM OF CURRENT LIMITATIONS
1. Debt Ceilings
Nearly all state constitutional debt ceilings are based on a fixed
percentage of the value of real property within the municipal bounda-
ries.2 5 Although relying on taxable real property as the sole index of
a local government's ability to service debt may have been reasonable
when the constitutional limits were adopted, the advisability of con-
tinued reliance on this sole criterion is open to serious question. Taxes
levied on real estate today provide less than half of local government
revenue.216 New York City, because of its reliance on numerous other
212. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
213. See generally A. SYED, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT (1966); Macchiarola, supra note 65; Richland, supra note 65. See also
Shannon, supra note 58; Shannon & Weissert, supra note 139, at 9-10 (arguing that
representative government requires closer scrutiny of financial decisions by elected
representatives, not state-imposed financial shackles or local referenda).
214. C. HARIss, supra note 70, at VII-8 to VIII-11. Professor Harriss also con-
tends that the restrictions must be constitutionalized in order to assure representation
of the interests of future voters. He thus attempts to combine the intergenerational
equity principle, see notes 25-27, 212 supra and accompanying text, with the political
responsiveness principle.
215. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
216. U.S. ADVisoRY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL-
STATE-LocAL FINANcEs: SIGNIFICANr FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 19 (1974); U.S.
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF Fis-
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taxes' and state and federal aid, derives less than one-quarter of its
Revenue Budget from real estate taxes. '
The original intention of state constitutional framers-that debt
ceilings keep municipal debt within the ultimate resources of the
community"D-can no longer be fulfilled by limiting debt to a speci-
fied percentage of assessed (or full) ieal property values. Nor can
contemporary investors be satisfied by a debt ceiling pegged to a
single portion of the municipal income base. Their concern is that a
municipal borrower exercise prudence in making long-term financial
commitments so as to assure its sustained ability to repay its debts
from all potential revenue sources."' Yet, the current framework of
debt restrictions in most states regulates, and places before the
courts,"' only a narrow slice of the total local government resource
base.
A constitutional debt limitation can accurately reflect a munici-
pality's long-term financing ability only if based on the average
amount of taxable wealth within the city, that is, average personal
and corporate wealth if an income tax is used and average sales
volume if a sales tax is also employed.2   Pennsylvania has already
CAL FEDERALISM: VOL. H-REVENUE AND DEBT 16-19, 26 (1977); Blaydon & Gilford,
Financing the Cities: An Issue Agenda, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1057, 1102-05.
217. See notes 140-42 supra and accompanying text. Paradoxically, New York
City's reliance on this broad range of taxes, once thought to be the solid basis for
financial salvation, see, e.g., Richland, supra note 65, at 612, actually hurt the City in
the economic climate that preceded the fiscal crisis. This was because sales and income
tax revenues decline in a recessionary period more than revenue from real estate taxes.
See Shalala & Bellamy, supra note 67, at 1120.
218. See 1979 Crry BUDGEr, supra note 102, at i; MoooY's supra note 123, at 2513-
14 (budget figures for fiscal 1972-1977). For a description of the relation of real estate
tax revenue to total tax revenue in New York City, see note 140 supra.
219. See T. Boast, Federal Programs, Urban Resources and the American Capi-
tal Market (Sept. 1976) (unpublished paper presented at Conference on Urban Choice
and State Power, Cornell University). See also notes 21-24 supra and accompanying
text.
220. Id. As one frequent commentator on New York's limitations put it:
The debt limit operates on an unwarranted assumption-that debt limit
should be related to real property value as a proper indicia of municipal
capacity to meet debt obligation. In addition, the numerous exemptions
distort any real relation between capacity and power to incur debt. . . . In
effect, they afford little meaningful regulation of municipal finance.
Macchiarola, supra note 70, at 285.
221. A constitutional debt limit grants the courts no power to examine the finan-
cial viability of particular bond issues; only the relationship between outstanding debt
and the debt limit can be reviewed.
222. This may well produce a rather complex formula, if all tax revenues are
taken into account in the proper proportions, but it would result in a more realistic
debt limitation than the current simpler debt/real property ratio produces.
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moved in this direction. Its new constitutional provision on local
government debt provides in part:
[T]he General Assembly shall prescribe the debt limits of all units
of local government including municipalities and school districts.
For such purposes, the debt limit base shall be a percentage of the
total revenue, as defined by the General Assembly, of the unit of
local government computed over a specific period immediately pre-
ceding the year of borrowing. ..2
A reformer who had devised a satisfactory formula for a more
accurate debt limitation would also seek to strengthen this ceiling to
prevent the sort of avoidance techniques described in Section II. At
the outset, categorical amendments that exempt housing, sewer con-
struction, or other particular activities from the overall debt limit22
should be repealed, to prevent the skewing of capital construction in
their direction.m
Even more far-ranging reform would include bringing all statu-
tory authorities, special districts, and general purpose local govern-
ments that cover the same geographic area under a single debt limita-
tion based on the wealth of the area. This might largely eliminate the
use of special authorities and districts as contrivances to avoid the
debt limit,26 while not interfering with their operations that promote
economic efficiency or overcome geographic and jurisdictional bar-
riers.m Although such a reform could make the overall debt limita-
tion a more accurate reflection of total local debt-incurring capacity,
its restrictive effect on the activities of special authorities would
likely -engender strong political opposition from special authority
223. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 10. Even this limitation does not take account of all
possible revenue sources, because the implementing legislation excludes state and
federal "subsidies or reimbursements" from the revenue base. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 6780-2(b)(2), -52(c) (Purdon Supp. 1978). See generally Comment, A Look at the
Local Government Unit Debt Act, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 322, 335-36 (1973). This may, how-
ever, be the correct approach, since there can be no certainty that a particular level of
intergovernmental aid will continue from year to year.
224. See notes 75-79 supra and accompanying text.
225. Such a reform need not lead to the elimination of housing, sewer construc-
tion, or other currently exempted projects that are considered desirable; it would
simply require raising the debt limit so as to reflect more accurately (in a single
percentage figure) the overall amount of outstanding debt. It may be desirable, how-
ever, to continue the practice of many states of exempting self-liquidating projects
from the overall debt limit, see, e.g., N.Y. CoNsT. art. VII, § 2-a; PA. CONST. art. IX,
§ 10, since these projects are not a drain on future local tax revenues.
226. It may be very difficult, however, to prevent evasion through the redrawing
of special district boundaries so that they do not coincide with general purpose local
government boundaries.
227. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
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managers, recipients of special authority services, and potential bond
purchasers.m
Less controversial would be a constitutional restriction upon
municipal short-term debt. There is a general consensus that contin-
ual growth and refinancing of short-term debt, with its higher interest
rates, contributed substantially to the New York City fiscal crisis.?
Prior to its December 1978 default, Cleveland also carried a very high
level of short-term debt. 0 Of those states that do allow local govern-
ments to incur short-term debt,2' nearly all require repayment of
TANs and RANs within one year or lessm2 and restrict total TANs to
between fifty and seventy-five percent of the amount of anticipated
tax.231 At least four states impose additional approval requirements.?'
228. Once adopted, it would engender new political conflicts over what propor-
tion of the local debt limit would be allocated to each special district or general purpose
local government in the area.
229. See, e.g., MAC REPORT, supra note 66, at 7; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
STUDY, supra note 66, at 5; SEC Final Report, supra note 193, at 952; Shalala &
Bellamy, supra note 67, at 1124-25.
230. See Kucinich Made a Last-Minute Plea to White House, N.Y. Times, Dec.
17, 1978, § L, at 25, col. 1.
231. For a relatively recent listing of states with no authorization for short-term
borrowing by local governments, see M. HiLL, STATE LAws GOVERNING LOCAL GoVERN-
MENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 15-42 (1978). Although Louisiana permits munic-
ipalities and parishes (the equivalent of counties) to borrow in anticipation of special
taxes or regular revenues, LA. STAT. REV. Am. § 39:741, :745 (West 1968), the state's
largest city (New Orleans) and parish (Orleans) are excluded from doing so. Id.
An interesting development, contemporaneous with the New York City fiscal cri-
sis, was Tennessee's repeal of statutory authorization for municipal short-term debt.
See Act of Mar. 17, 1976, ch. 784, § 3, 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1071 (repealing TENN.
CODE ANN. § 6-812). The same enactment allowed Tennessee counties to retain the
power to issue TANs, but added the requirement of prior approval by the state director
of local finance. TENN. CODE ANN. § 5-1035 (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar.
17, 1976, ch. 784, § 2, 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1071.
232. See GA. CONST. art. IX, § VII, para. IV; IND. CODE ANN. § 17-1-24-31 (Bums
1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:747 (West 1968) (requiring payment of TANs by March
1 of year after issuance); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-169, 159-170 (1976) (forbidding
renewals of TANs and RANs); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 133.30 (Page 1978) (requiring
that TANs and RANs mature within six months); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6780-203
(Purdon Supp. 1978) (requiring TANs to mature within fiscal year issued); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 5-1035 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 15.1-222, .1-224 (1973) (municipal TANs and
RANs must mature within one year of issuance but may be renewed from time to
time); id. § 15.1-545 to .1-546 (Supp. 1978) (no extension of county RANs permitted).
But see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39:741, :743 (West 1968) (five year maturity period
permitted for notes in anticipation of special taxes).
233. See GA. CONST. art. IX, § VII, para. IV (notes limited to 75% of estimated
income from special taxes); MINN. STAT. § 473.11(2) (1978) (TANs of metropolitan
governments limited to 50%); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-169 (1976) (TANs limited to 50%,
RANs to 80%); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 133.30 (Page 1978) (both TANs and RANs
limited to 50%, except when final tax settlement delayed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 5-1035
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So far, however, very few have chosen to constitutionalize such re-
strictions.2s
A constitutional debt ceiling taking account of the local govern-
ment's true income base, preventing evasion by special authorities,
containing no exceptions for specific services, and limiting the
amount of short-term debt would be a substantial improvement over
the haphazard, exception-riddled system under which most munici-
palities operate today. This type of tight constitutional ceiling on
local government debt financing would emphasize the principles of
(Supp. 1978) (county TANs limited to 60%); VA. CODE 15.1-545 (Supp. 1978) (county
TANs limited to 50%). But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6780-202 (Purdon Supp. 1978)
(notes up to 85% of anticipated revenues); VA. CODE §§ 15.1-222, .1-224 (1973) (no
comparable percentage limit upon municipal TANs).
The only restriction on ordinary TANs in Indiana, Iowa, and Louisiana is that they
may not exceed the total estimated income for the current year. See IND. CODE ANN. §
17-1-24-31 (Burns 1974) (counties); id. § 18-1-4-3 (Burns Supp. 1978) (cities and
towns); IOWA CODE § 384.10 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:746 (West 1968). Louis-
iana, however, has an additional check by requiring the approval of that state's De-
partment of the Treasury for short-term as well as long-term local government debt.
See notes 234, 311-312 infra. Florida grants even broader power for the issuance of
TANs, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 166.101 to 166.121 (West Supp. 1979), but requires voter
approval for those that mature more than one year after issuance. R.. CONST. art. VII,
§ 12.
234. North Carolina requires the approval of the Local Government Commission
before any local government notes can be issued. In making its determination, the
Commission is required to consider the "reasonableness of the budget estimates of the
taxes or other revenues" that stand behind the notes and the overall amount of short-
term debt issued by the local government. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-172 (1976). If properly
enforced, this requirement could serve as a check on the type of TAN and RAN abuses
practiced by New York City, described at notes 85, 116-126 supra and accompanying
text.
Georgia requires local voter approval of short-term debt that exceeds one-fifth of
one percent of assessed property value. See GA. CONsT. art. IX, § VII, para. I. Florida
requires it for "tax anticipation certificates, payable from ad valorem taxation and
maturing more than twelve months after issuance." FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 12. Voter
approval of local government bonds is discussed further at notes 286-92 infra and
accompanying text.
Louisiana requires all local government debt to be approved by the State Depart-
ment of the Treasury, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:871, 47:1803-:1804 (West 1968). This
requirement applies to both short and long-term debt. See [1946-1948] LA. Arr'Y GEN.
Op. & REP. 524-25. State government approval of local debt is discussed further at
notes 300-30 infra and accompanying text.
235. Georgia's constitution explicitly regulates the substantive aspects of short-
term debt by setting the percentage of anticipated income allowed and the time of
required repayment. GA. CONST. art. IX, § VII, para. IV. See notes 232-33 supra and
accompanying text. Florida's constitution employs a procedural regulation, requiring
a vote of the local electorate when the TANs mature more than 12 months after
issuance. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 12. The Florida provision, therefore, applies only to
those TANs that resemble long-term debt. Maturity limitations of other states are
cited in note 232 supra.
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economic stability and intergenerational equity.23 Unless it were
fairly high, however, such a constitutional debt ceiling, standing
alone, could preclude both local fiscal flexibility27 and political re-
sponsiveness. For example, voters in a particular locality seeking to
raise the limit would need to obtain support for a constitutional
amendment from voters throughout the state.2s
2. Tax Limits
Just as the growth of alternative sources of municipal income
make debt ceilings based on real estate values unrealistic,23 so too
does it compel a reevaluation of existing restrictions on local taxation.
The pattern in many states today is a combination of constitutional
restrictions on local real estate taxation rates240 and statutory authori-
zation for other forms of local taxation.2 14 Only those who cling to the
claim that property owners still merit treatment as a privileged class
can justify such differential treatment in the legal control of real
estate and other taxes.2 42 Intergenerational equity certainly cannot
serve as the justifying principle for these constitutional real estate tax
limits. Such limits protect only the present generation of taxpayers,
who can effectively protect themselves from excessive taxation
236. Some means of accommodating the demands of current taxpayers may also
be necessary to prevent the financing of long-term expenses through immediate taxa-
tion. This is the other aspect of intergenerational equity. See note 27 supra and accom-
panying text. As argued more fully below, see text accompanying notes 243-44 infra,
this is better done by means of referenda requirements than through constitutional tax
limits.
237. Restriction on flexibility would be particularly severe in states, such as New
York, that mandate substantial financial burdens for local governments. See notes 62-
70 supra and accompanying text.
238. Amendment would be particularly difficult in those states that require a
vote by two-thirds of the electorate or two-thirds of the legislature.
299. See notes 215-221 supra and accompanying text.
240. See sources cited in note 17 supra. Levy limits, however, have been imposed
by statute. See notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
241. See generally ACIR, TAx AND EXPENDrruRE Lmors, supra note 32, at 49-65;
Sperling, Municipal Income Taxation and Home Rule, 1 URB. LAw. 281 (1969).
242. See notes 20, 35 supra and accompanying text. This claim has been the
driving force behind Proposition 13 and its progeny, see notes 48-52 supra and accom-
panying text, despite criticism by advocates of expenditure limits that the focus upon
a single class of taxpayers was shortsighted. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
Recent reports show that the principal beneficiaries of Proposition 13 itself have been
commercial landowners and the federal government (through reduced income tax de-
ductions), rather than residential owners or tenants. See Business Bonanza: Compa-
nies' Big Saving From Proposition 13 Is Slow to Reach Public, Wall St. J., Feb. 13,
1979, at 1, col. 1. See also Heller, "Meat-Axe" Radicalism in California, Wall St. J.,
June 5, 1978, at 18, col. 4.
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through referenda24 or ordinary elections." Moreover, constitutional
tax limits, like constitutional debt ceilings, reduce fiscal flexibility
and undercut responsiveness to the concerns of local voters."'
Should state policymakers nevertheless enact constitutional tax
limitations, they should make such limitations effective. To do so,
they must prevent current forms of avoidance.2 4 One long-standing
device to prevent overlapping state, county, special district, and city
government authorities from multiplying the property tax burden is
a limitation on the total annual amount of tax that can be imposed
on any particular piece of property.247 The tax burden can also be
controlled by freezing assessments at the rate imposed in an earlier
year, with yearly increases strictly limited."'
In addition, ad hoc exemptions for taxes used for particular func-
tions249 should be abolished, so that the stated rate is, in fact, the
overall tax rate. Yet, some narrow exemptions may have to be re-
tained. Attempts to remove the current exemptions for taxes imposed
to cover debt service 25° on outstanding bonds, for example, would
meet with strong political and legal opposition from existing inves-
tors. 251 Moreover, retaining that exemption would make marketing of
243. See notes 293-98 infra and accompanying text.
244. See text accompanying notes 282-83 infra.
245. See notes 237-38 supra and accompanying text.
246. They might also want to impose comparable constitutional limitations on
other taxes by, for example, indexing the income tax to the inflation rate. See note
210 supra and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. 10, § 2; Omo RaV. CODE ANN. § 5705.02 (Page
1973); OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 9(a). See generally, ACIR, TAx AND EXPENDrruRE LiMrrs,
supra note 32, at 11-12; see also ACIR, LocAL TAXING, supra note 28, at 27-30. A
limitation on the total amount of tax would be particularly helpful in those states that
permit special districts to exercise independent taxing power.
248. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. XIIIA, § 2; Act of Mar. 9, 1979, ch. 18, sec. 1, §
2(b), 1979 Idaho Advance Legis. Serv. Pamph. No. 1, at 10 (to be codified as IDAHO
CODE § 63-923).
249. For a discussion of one such exemption in New York, see notes 133-34 supra
and accompanying text.
250. For a discussion of the fiscal effects of the New York provision, N.Y. CONST.
art. VIII, see notes 133-44 supra and accompanying text.
251. Current investors might even be able to argue that repeal of such provisions
would impair the security of their investments to such an extent that it would violate
their rights under the Contract Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See, e.g., United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). Cf. Tron v. Condello, 427 F. Supp.
1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (statute authorizing purchase of MAC and City bonds by New
York City teachers' Retirement Fund does not violate Contract Clause, even if such
purchase may impair security of Retirement Fund, because legislative authorization
of investments was part of original "contract"). See generally Hale, The Supreme
Court and The Contract Clause, 57 HARv. L. Rav. 512 (1944); Hurst, Municipal Bonds
and the Contract Clause: Looking Beyond United States Trust Company v. New
Jersey, 5 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. (1978). It is probably for this reason that even Proposi-
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future local government bonds substantially easier.nl Because special
assessments are directly used to provide localized benefits, they are
not easily subject to abuse, and should also remain as an exception
to the real estate tax limit.
A special case of tax limit avoidance is presented when localities
capitalize current operating expenses. While other local governments
may not have employed this device to the same extent as has New
York City, it is certainly not an unknown technique. According to the
report of an independent accounting firm, Cleveland officials capital-
ized $52 million worth of operating expenses between January 1972
and July 19 7 8 ,21 rather than raise property taxes. 5 The danger exists
that other state and municipal officials will exploit this device when
the new tighter tax limits begin to impinge.B For example, the very
severe constitutional tax limitations recently adopted in California?7
made no change in that state's constitutional provision dealing with
local debt financing.2S Local officials, therefore, may be tempted to
resort to debt financing for expenses that cannot be paid from current
revenues.29 Such a practice can, however, be curbed by tightening
tion 13 exempts from its limit taxes imposed "to pay the interest and redemption
charges on any [prior] indebtedness." See CAL. CONST. XIIlA, § 1(b). See generally
Robinson, Outline of Proposition 13 and the Impairment of Contract (supplement to
COPING wrrH CUTBACKS IN MUNICIPAL REVENUES (1978) (New York Law Journal publica-
tion) [hereinafter cited as COPING WITH CurBAcKs]) (describing current interpreta-
tion problems relating to the coverage of this provision).
252. Local governments subject to severe tax limits without a debt service excep-
tion will, at the very least, be subject to lower bond ratings and will be forced to pay
higher interest rates, if they can sell their bonds at all. See Guandolo, Tax Limitations:
Impact Upon General Obligation Bonds, Rental Bonds, Special Assessment Bonds and
Payment of Debt Service 10-13 (supplement to COPING wrrH CUTBACKS, supra note 251).
253. See generally State ex rel. Frese v. City of Normandy Park, 64 Wash. 2d
411, 421-23, 392 P.2d 207, 214-15 (1964); D. MANDELKER & D. NnrscH, supra note 83,
at 327-41. Guandolo, supra note 252, at 25-28.
254. See note 230 supra. See also City of Cleveland, Preliminary Official State-
ment of Dec. 1, 1978, at 2 (relating to sale of various purpose general obligation bonds,
limited tax). ("The practice of commingling the proceeds of general obligation bond
and note issues with tax and other revenues in municipal treasuries is followed by a
number of Ohio municipalities. The City of Cleveland has utilized this commingling
practice, expending its commingled funds for both capital and operating expenses.").
255. On February 27, 1979, Cleveland residents voted to increase income taxes
from 1% to 1.5% in order to meet part of that city's deficit. Kucinich and Foes Claim
Victory in Cleveland Vote on Fiscal Steps, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1979, § A, at 16, col.
1.
256. See Illusory Lightening, supra note 95, at 103, 107.
257. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. See generally Amador Valley Joint Union High
School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 308, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr.
239 (1978).
258. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18.
259. Since California's debt provision requires a two-thirds vote of the qualified
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debt limits to eliminate exclusions260 or by curtailing legislative dis-
cretion to authorize capitalization of particular budget items."'
In short, constitutional tax limits are an unnecessary means of
protecting local taxpayers. If, they are adopted in response to current
political pressures, however, they should be sufficiently high to allow
flexibility,28 2 and opportunities for evasion should be eliminated. In
addition, tax and debt restrictions should be coordinated, so that
local officials can select between tax or debt financing of projects on
the basis of which better satisfies the goal of intergenerational equity,
rather than as a means of avoiding one or the other limit.
3. Expenditure Limits
Arizona's long experience reveals that many of the same tech-
niques employed to avoid tax and debt limits can be used to avoid
local spending limits. 3 Accordingly, to be what it purports to be, a
spending limit must eliminate both categorical and ad hoc excep-
tions.2 4 Also, unless state and special district expenditures are con-
trolled, functions will simply shift from one level of government to
another, resulting in expansion in government spending and an in-
creased tax burden despite the expenditure lid.
To provide needed flexibility, a spending limit should incorpo-
rate into its formula a means of allowing for natural growth of state
and local expenditures, in response to inflation, population expan-
sion, and growth in per capita income. 211 Yet, even if it included such
electors to approve any indebtedness, see id., it might be argued that voters who had
approved the severe tax limitations of Proposition 13 would not sanction a substantial
local debt; but this argument ignores the fact that Proposition 13 was a tax limitation
passed on the basis of a state-wide vote. Voters in particular localities may still ap-
prove the use of debt financing for particular projects or even for general revenues.
Moreover, local officials, by carefully choosing the subject of the bond referenda may
be able to gain substantial voter support even from supporters of Proposition 13.
260. See notes 224-27 supra and accompanying text.
261. In New York, this would require repeal of N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, which
makes the legislative determination of the period of probable usefulness "conclusive."
See notes 143-50 supra and accompanying text.
262. Especially in states without California's substantial surplus to cushion the
blow, the sudden imposition of a very low tax limit (like Proposition 13) may have
severe detrimental effects on local governments. See Guandolo, supra note 252, at 3;
R. Odell, untitled presentation (supplement to COPING wrrH CUTBACKS, supra note 251).
See also Evans, supra note 52, at 79-80; McCarthy, Living with Proposition 13, STATE
LEGISLATURES, Sept. 1978, at 16.
263. See notes 163-84 supra and accompanying text.
264. See notes 170-73 supra and accompanying text.
265. A proposed amendment to Arizona's local spending limit that included such
growth indices was defeated, apparently because the legislature thought it too compli-
cated. Koon, supra note 163, at 25, col. 4. The new seven percent limit on spending
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a built-in escalator, a constitutional spending limit would severely
limit local government flexibility, particularly in smaller localities.
Since their current budgets are generally modest, the hiring of just
one additional police officer or firefighter for the next year might
increase their budgets beyond the permitted percentage increase.2 ",
Some procedure must also be available for permitting unusual levels
of expenditure in response to a crisis. Arizona's experience has shown,
though, that such emergency appeal procedures may be subject to
severe abuse. 2' Moreover, spending limits encourage economic ineffi-
ciencies, even in routine daily operations. They may, for example,
offer an incentive for local governments to spend the full amount of
money available to them in order to prevent their budget base from
being reduced in future years.2 8 Spending limits also discourage bulk
purchasing and other innovations which, although creating addi-
tional short-run costs, result in economies of scale or long-range sav-
ings. 2 '
C. ABOLITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
Rather than intensifying constitutional restrictions on local debt
financing, taxation, and spending powers, the second alternative
would abolish constitutional limits altogether, relying instead on se-
curities market forces to limit debt financing and subsequent local
voter reaction to restrict taxation and spending. Because these forces
would be inadequate by themselves, statutory fiscal controls would
also be required.
1. Debt Financing
Prior to New York City's fiscal crisis, abolition of the New York
by the state is, however, pegged to personal income, Amz. CONST., art. IX, § 17, thereby
building in at least one growth index.
266. LEAGUE SUMMARY, supra note 163, at 4; see Koon, supra note 163, at 25, col.
1.
267. See notes 174-76 supra and accompanying text.
268. Arizona avoids this problem by allowing the percentage increase to be ap-
plied to the proposed budget of the prior year rather than to the actual budget. See
ARuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-302(D), -303(C) (Supp. 1978); LEAGUE SUMMARY, supra
note 163, at 2. Thus, local governments are not forced to spend to the full extent of
their budget estimates in order to retain the ability to spend at that level the next year.
Arizona's system does, however, encourage local governments to violate the principle
of presenting accurate, intelligible information to their citizens, see notes 188, 209-11
supra and accompanying text, because local officials are likely to make their public
budget estimates at the highest possible level, whether or not this is an accurate
reflection of spending plans. See Koon," supra note 163, at 25, cols. 1-3.
269. See Koon, supra note 163, at 25, col. 55. See generally Shannon, supra note
58, at 24-25; J. Shannon, supra note 50.
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constitutional debt ceiling received substantial support from both
official sources270 and commentators.2 1 Dissatisfaction with the
straight-jacketing effects inherent in constitutional debt ceilings has,
in fact, been fairly widespread. 2 The literature emphasizes a history
of repeated evasions of current constitutional limits and the detri-
ment that even improved constitutional limits would pose for local
fiscal flexibility and home rule.
If financial reporting were sufficiently comprehensible,27 the
overall debt level might be controlled by ultimate voter reaction. In
the interim, however, market managers and investors are more likely
to provide an effective check? 4 Unfortunately, both voter and market
control generally come too late-after a city has already exceeded a
prudent leverage level. 275 Furthermore, market controls, when they
finally operate, are too draconian to be the sole control mechanism.
They may, for example, completely block the sale of securities issued
to finance local indebtedness and imperil the credit rating of the
affected city and state for many years? 8 For this reason, statutory
controls should also be employed.277 Many states already operate with
only statutory limits on local government debt. Even these states
should, however, modify their limits so that they take into account
270. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT No. 31, supra note 70; STAFF REPoRT No. 11, supra
note 70.
271. See, e.g., Hyman, Home Rule in New York 1941-1965: Retrospect and
Prospect, 15 BUFFALO L. Rnv. 335, 366-69 (1966); Macchiarola, supra note 140; Rich-
land, supra note 65.
272. See, e.g., U. S. AnvisoRY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
STATE CONSTrrUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LocAL GOVERNMEr Danr 1-5
(1961); U. S. AWVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE TECHNi-
CAL ASSISTANC E TO LocAL GovERNMMEr DEBT MANAGEMENT 20-21 (1965); Bowmar, supra
note 4; Mitchell, supra note 1; Sperling, supra note 241. But see C. HARlass, supra note
70, at VII-1 to VII-7. See also Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home
Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 653 (1946).
273. See notes 188, 209-11 supra and accompanying text.
274. See note 199 supra. See also Illusory Lightening, supra note 95, at 103. For
a severe criticism of the very limited amount of research conducted and disclosure
made by underwriters, rating agencies, and bond counsel prior to the New York City
crisis, see SEC STAFF REPORT supra note 124, at chs. 4-6. For a qualified endorsement
of improvements subsequently adoptedby some of these market managers and advis-
ers, see Supplemental Staff Report, supra note 208, at 967-70.
275. See C. HARmiss, supra note 70, at VII-2 to VII-3.
276. See generally Shalala & Bellamy, supra note 67, at 1126-27; Comment, New
York-A City in Crisis: Fiscal Emergency Legislation and the Constitutional Attacks,
6 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 65, 100 n.227 (1977).
277. Like constitutional debt ceilings, statutory limits tend to undercut fiscal
home rule, but they do allow for greater flexibility and responsiveness.
278. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 475.53 (1978); NEv. REv. STAT. § 266.600(4) (1973).
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the total wealth available to a borrowing local government, not
merely its assessed real property value.
2. Taxation
Scholars have also criticized the current constitutional tax limi-
tations in New York"' and other states."' As noted above, constitu-
tional tax limits are not generally required in order to ensure inter-
generational equityYu2 Moreover, they can have severe negative ef-
fects on local fiscal flexibility and home rule.
There is no doubt that current public sentiment makes abolition
of constitutional tax limits unlikely, but it should be made clear that
removing constitutional limits would not necessarily cause real estate
taxes to skyrocket. State legislatures would retain power to limit
excessive real estate taxes, as they currently do with respect to other
forms of local taxation. Moreover, local officials would be loathe to
impose excessive taxes for fear of voter retaliation. Although this
check also appears to suffer from the same post hoc quality that voter
and market checks on debt exhibit,m excessive taxes, unlike exces-
sive debts, can be repealed by a new administration elected on a tax
relief platform.
3. Expenditures
Expenditure limits are also better imposed by statute, if at all,
than by constitutional amendment, since they regulate short and
mid-term financial decisions, not the long-term financial commit-
ments involved in debt financing. In order to maintain effective con-
trol over spending levels, however, an expenditure limit should prob-
ably be combined with some form of administrative oversight.24
D. REGULATION By PRIOR VOTER APPROVAL
Instead of imposing various substantive limits, or relying on sub-
sequent voter and market vetoes, the third approach employs the
procedural constraint of prior voter approval for particular local gov-
ernment financial decisions. It emphasizes principles of fiscal flexi-
bility and local responsiveness. The improved financial accounting
279. See notes 215-23 supra and accompanying text.
280. See note 271 supra.
281. See, e.g., ACIR, TAx N EXPENDrruRE Lnmrrs, supra note 32 at 6, 9-10;
Shannon, supra note 58; Sperling, supra note 241; J. Shannon, supra note 50.
282. See text accompanying notes 243-44 supra. Direct voting requirements may,
however, be useful. See notes 293-98 infra and accompanying text.
283. See notes 274-77 supra and accompanying text.
284. See notes 300-30 infra and accompanying text.
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standards discussed above2 are essential, however, if prior voter ap-
proval is to operate as an effective procedural check.
1. Bond Referenda
There are various means of requiring constituency approval as a
prerequisite to local government borrowing. Although a referendum
may be the sole requirement, it may also be an adjunct to a substan-
tive limit or be used to override a substantive limit.
Several state constitutions require the electors to cast an affirm-
ative vote before a local government undertakes substantial debt
financing, using this as a complete substitute for a substantive limit
on the overall debt level.Y' The North Carolina Constitution, for
example, provides that the General Assembly's power to authorize a
local government unit to contract debt is ineffective unless approved
by a majority of the qualified voters in that locality.2 Similarly, local
governments in Florida~u and large cities in Arkansas",' may issue
bonds only upon approval of their electors. This approach places
responsibility for the debt financing of individual capital projects
squarely on the shoulders of local constituents, rather than imposing
285. See notes 188-211 supra and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 16, § 1 (of the local units only "cities of the first
and second class" may utilize debt financing, and then only upon the consent of a
majority of the voters in that city); CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18 (requirement of two-
thirds vote by qualified local electors, except simple majority can approve reconstruc-
tion of structurally unsafe school buildings); FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 12 (exception for
refunding at lower interest rate); LA. CONST. art. VI, § 33(A) (exception for refunding
at lower interest rate; requirement of administrative approval in addition to voter ap-
proval). In other states, only a referendum requirement is imposed by the Constitution,
while substantive limits are merely statutory. See, e.g, IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3;
IDAHO CODE § 50-1019 (Supp. 1978).
287. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4(2). Prior voter approval is not, however, required
for bonds issued
(a) to fund or refund a valid existing debt;
(b) to supply an unforeseen deficiency in the revenue;
(c) to borrow in anticipation of the collection of taxes due and payable
within the current fiscal year to an amount not exceeding 50 per cent
of such taxes;
(d) to suppress riots or insurrections;
(e) to meet emergencies immediately threatening the public health or
safety, as conclusively determined in writing by the Governor;
(f) for purposes authorized by general laws uniformly applicable through-
out the State, to the extent of two-thirds of the amount by which the
[local] unit's outstanding indebtedness shall have been reduced during
the next preceding fiscal year.
Id,
288. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 12.
289. ARK. CONST. art. 16, § 1.
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an overall constitutional limit amendable only by a state-wide vote.
It can be argued, however, that local voters are either unaware
of the consequences of bond issues or discount their full implications.
They might, therefore, approve an inordinate amount of debt-
financing, thereby violating the intergenerational equity principle. 90
On the other hand, bond referenda require local political leaders to
"sell" every capital project to their constituencies, perhaps resulting
in the rejection of important projects because of their social rather
than their financial implications. " ' In either case, too much direct
responsiveness to the immediate demands of voters may thus result
in a diminished policymaking role for local elected officials.
Several other states have constitutional or statutory provisions
making voter approval an adjunct to their overall debt ceilings. Penn-
sylvania, for example, permits political subdivisions to incur indebt-
edness beyond the overall debt limit only with the assent of a major-
ity of qualified local electors. 2 1 Such an approach seems designed to
encourage local participation as well as prudent investigation of the
worthiness of individual bond issues, because voters are clearly in-
formed that they are being asked to approve borrowing in excess of
the state-wide constitutional ceiling. Some danger of misinformed
voter evaluation of individual bond issues may, however, still remain.
2. Tax Referenda
Tax referenda are probably most effective as adjuncts to consti-
tutional or statutory tax limits. 22 They allow local residents to decide
whether to exceed the state-mandated tax limit in order to pay for
particular desired services.2 9' This approach furthers both home rule
and local fiscal flexibility principles.
290. This danger may be exacerbated by demographic developments in large
American cities that give rise to an increased public-sector-dependent voter popula-
tion. For a discussion of these developments in New York City, see note 71 supra.
291. Historically, such difficulties have arisen when bonds are used to finance
an activity involving intergenerational transfers such as school construction. In the
present economic and political climate, negative voter reaction may well spread to
other social services. See generally D. MANDELKER & D. NmrsCH, supra note 83, at 375;
Herbers, Deciding by Referendum Is a Popular Proposition, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1978,
§ E, at 4, col. 3; Lipset & Rabb, supra note 51.
292. See PA. CONSr. art. IX, § 10; Local Government Unit Debt Act, Act No.
1978-52, art. 11, secs. 5-6, § § 201-202, 1978 Pa. Legis. Serv. 110 (amending PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6780-51, -52 (Purdon 1979)). Cf. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 133.03 (Page
1978) (prescribing an overall municipal debt limit of 5.5% of total value of taxable
property, with permission for up to 5% more if authorized by local electors).
293. See notes 239-62, 280-83 supra and accompanying text.
294. In this respect, they are analogous to the use of voter override provisions for
debt limits. See note 292 supra and accompanying text.
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A possible objection to voter override provisions is that, in cities
with a large welfare-sector-dependent population, voters will tend to
approve inordinate tax levels. " ' Such a hypothesis seems incorrect,
however, since property owners and taxpayers are generally better
organized than are welfare recipients, and renters generally recog-
nize, or can be persuaded, that higher taxes mean higher rents. "
A more serious problem would be presented if tax levels were
totally determined by prior voter approval. The likely effect would be
blocking of real estate taxes, forcing local government to rely on taxes
that the electorite could not veto: sales, development impact,"7 and
commuter income taxes.29 Revenue collection would be seriously
skewed under such a procedure.
3. Expenditure Level Referenda
It would be unworkable for a locality to seek a direct vote of its
citizens prior to each major expenditure. Such an approach not only
violates the principle of fiscal flexibility but also precludes local offi-
cials from making priority determinations. This is not to say that
local governments should never use referenda to gauge public senti-
ment on particular types of projects. " But it is better to provide that,
through use of direct voting, citizens may override expenditure limits
in those states that impose constitutional or statutory spending limits
on local government.
A referendum requirement may be a useful ingredient in any
local government fiscal control system. Such a requirement is partic-
ularly valuable for capital projects, because debt financing involves
long-term financial commitment by the community as a whole. Re-
ferenda may also be useful for taxing and spending determinations.
295. See note 290 supra and accompanying text.
296. Even the strictest rent control ordinances and statutes permit rent increases
to reflect higher property taxes. See, e.g., New York State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal Rent and Eviction Regulations, § 33(6), reprinted in N.Y. UN-
CONSOL. LAWs, at 147, 203 (McKinney 1974).
297. In many California localities, development impact taxes have already been
adopted at relatively high rates. See [1978] 6 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 398; The Post-
13 Barrage of New Local Levies, TAx REvOLT Di., Nov. 1978, at 1, 7. See also Contrac-
tom & Builders Assn. v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d.314 (Fla. 1976).
298. Although nonresidents have attacked municipal commuter income taxes on
the ground that they are denied the right to vote on the taxation level, courts have
generally rejected such claims. See D. MANDELKER & D. NErSCH, supra note 83, at 353-
58 and sources cited therein.
299. They are especially useful for municipalities without strong political party
organizations. For example, the City of Miami, which has a non-partisan government,
has frequently chosen to use referenda to test voter sentiment on zoning and other
issues. Interview with George Knox, City Attorney of Miami, in Miami, Florida (July
1978).
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If local representatives are to establish priorities for public expendi-
tures, however, local referenda should be employed only as override
mechanisms.
E. REGULATION BY ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AGENCY
Even if constitutional and statutory debt and tax limitations can
be reformed to provide for a more realistic measure of a locality's
financial capacity3 " and to restrict current avoidance devices,30 ' they
are nevertheless an incomplete means of ensuring local government
fiscal integrity. For this purpose, a more comprehensive approach
must be employed. Though expenditure limits have a broader scope
than do limitations on debt and taxes, they provide no method of
monitoring local techniques of avoidance. Moreover, large cities, par-
ticularly those that are expanding to the level of diseconomies of
scale," ' have an acute need for comprehensive administrative coordi-
nation of, and systematic accountability for, financial affairs. 3 '
A semi-independent administrative oversight agency may be
able to perform these overlapping functions of monitoring, coordinat-
ing, and assuring accountability. If administered by the state, such
an oversight agency would face serious opposition from fiscal home
rule advocates concerned about its potential for influencing local pol-
icy decisions. Many authors have contended that even present sys-
tems of borrowing restraints impose too much state control over local
finances," ' and others have noted the extreme policy controls im-
posed by the federal government in matching-fund urban renewal,
mass transit, and highway programs3 '5 Extension of state adminis-
trative control over local finance may be just as politically objectiona-
ble.'" Much potential opposition could, however, be diffused by care-
300. See notes 219-23, 240-45 supra and accompanying text.
301. See notes 224-38, 246-61 supra and accompanying text.
302. For a discussion of the many diseconomies of scale created by extremely
large local governments, especially New York City, see W. FARB, L. LwBM,, & J.
WOOD, DECENTRALIZING CITY GovERNME : A PRAcncAL STUDY OF A RADICAL PROPOSAL
FOR NEW YORK Crry 26 (1972); M. Gelfand, supra note 73, at 13-14.
303. See W. Lovett, Economics, Law and Governance (1974), at ch. VII (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author). Professor Lovett argues that bodies such as the
Office of Management and Budget, General Accounting Office, and Congressional
Budget Office should be greatly expanded and that similar bodies should be created
at the state and local level. Id. at 13, 21.
304. See, e.g., Macchiarola, supra note 140, at 864-65; Richland, supra note 65,
at 620-21, 628-29.
305. See note 154 supra.
306. See, e.g., Kucinich and Foes Claim Victory in Cleveland Vote on Fiscal
Steps, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1. 1979, § A, at 16, col. 1 (describing the opposition of
Cleveland's mayor to a state-dominated fiscal oversight board to be used to assist in
that city's financial recovery).
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ful attention to the means of selecting members and powers granted
to the oversight agency.
1. Means of Selection
The necessary independence of an administrative oversight
agency from local government political pressures can be supplied in
a number of ways: through state government appointment, indepen-
dent election, long-term appointment by the local government chief
executive, or appointment by several local officials.
Local governments in England and Wales provide a model for
control of local finance by a higher level of government. There, nearly
all"' local authorities are required to obtain a "loan sanction" from
the central government for each act of borrowing." 8 While the Depart-
ment of the Environment issues the local sanctions and keeps records
of approved loans, the actual decisionmaking occurs in the individual
central departments, e.g., the Home Office for the construction of
police stations, whose procedures for approval vary widely.0 ' The
loan sanction procedure is primarily intended to enhance central gov-
ernment control over the economy and to minimize competition be-
tween the Treasury and local authorities for private capital and, sec-
ondarily, to influence local policy.31 Localities in states with a strong
tradition of home rule would no doubt oppose the adoption of a com-
parable system, which would shift control to the hands of state ad-
ministrators. In Louisiana, however, political subdivisions wishing to
issue bonds or notes or to levy any special tax"' have long been
307. The Greater London Council and the London County Council, its smaller
predecessor, have been excluded from the loan sanction system. An annual Act of
Parliament has set the overall debt ceiling for these local governments. E. SHARP, THE
MInISTRY OF HOUSING AND LocAL GovERNMENT 30 (1969).
308. P. RichADs, THE Reformed LocAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 91 (1973); J. GRIF-
FITH, CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS AND LocAL AUTHORITIES 76 (1966). In 1970, an attempt was
made to reduce the detailed central review of relatively minor local projects. Local
capital investments were divided into "key sector" projects-education, housing, prin-
cipal roads, police, health, social services, water supply, and sewerage-which remain
subject to the loan sanction, and "locally determined" projects, for which local author-
ities may use a ration of loan sanction as they see fit. P. RcmHARDs, supra, at 91. The
latter type of projects, which previously fell into the "miscellaneous programmes"
category, had in the past often been dropped in times of economic stringency. E.
SHAR, supra note 307, at 30.
309. J. GmFfrr, supra note 308, at 93. See generally M. Gelfand, supra note
73, at 55-56.
310. See J. GRnrrH, supra note 308, at 88-89; P. RIcHARDs, supra note 308, at
91. The potential impact of the loan sanction system as a policy instrument of the
Department of the Environment, however, is rather limited. See M. Gelfand, supra
note 73, at 55-56.
311. Special taxes are levied for "the purpose of acquiring constructing, improv-
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required to obtain the approval of a state agency, currently the De-
partment of the Treasury 2" Other states already have state boards
with limited advisory powers on local borrowing '1 3 that could be
granted mandatory powers, should state policymakers decide that
more centralized control is needed.
Another alternative is separate election of the chief officer of the
fiscal oversight board. Several cities already have elected comptrol-
lers, who could be given additional auditing and oversight powers." 4
A difficult problem, however, is determining what powers such a
directly-elected official should be granted.3 1 5 The directly-elected
New York City Comptroller, for instance, has long exercised substan-
tial policymaking and administrative duties in addition to his post-
auditing functions."' He has thus acted as both chief financial officer
and fiscal watchdog."' While this range of powers and responsibili-
ties-exceeding those granted to any other municipal comptrol-
ler-has given him substantial power to implement his financial pol-
icy decisions, the result in practice is that he often audits his own
work. 8 Involvement of the Comptroller's Office in many of the ques-
tionable financial practices that preceded the City's fiscal crisis is
evidence of an undesirable conflict of roles".3 1 On the other hand, an
ing, maintaining, or operating any work of public improvement" by any political
subdivision of the state. Special taxes may be "authorized by a majority of the electors
in the political subdivision who vote thereon in an election held for that purpose." LA.
CONST. art. 6, § 32.
312. See id. art. 6 § 33(A); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36:769 (West Supp. 1978); id.
§ 39:871 (West 1968); id. § 47:180 (West 1952).
313. The Virginia State Commission on Local Debt, composed of the Auditor of
Public Accounts, State Treasurer, State Tax Commissioner, and two gubernatorial
appointees, has limited powers to aid political subdivisions in planning and marketing
their bond issues. Currently, it acts only upon request by a political subdivision and,
even then, may only advise local officials on matters relating to planning, preparation,
and marketing of local debt. See VA. CODE § 15 (1973).
314. See S. CLIFFORD, OFFICE OF Tm CoMPrRoLuL oR T CrrY or NEW YoRK app.
(1973) (report prepared for the State Charter Revision Commission for New York City).
315. The problem is to provide a serious check on fiscal activities of other local
officials without undercutting their policy power and without turning the comptroller
into another politician with a stake in fiscally irresponsible activities.
316. See S. CLIFFORD, supra note 314.
317. Id. at 12, 26-27.
318. Id. at 25-29.
319. This was particularly true with respect to the overestimation of funds stand-
ing behind TANs and the capitalization of expense items. See notes 116-26, 143-150
supra and accompanying text. See also SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 124, ch. 3, at
27-33. Just before the fiscal crisis, the Comptroller became the principal advocate of
various other deficit funding devices-reduction of collective bargaining reserves and
welfare expense estimates, postponement of accrued payments to retirement funds,
and partial changes from accrual to cash basis accounting to defer recognition of
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elected comptroller without substantial power may be unable to in-
fluence other powerful public officials by direct persuasion2 ° or
through popular political pressure.32 1 Just how effective a comptroller
can be is ultimately determined by the powers the office is granted,
the political alignments in the locality, and the range of other local
fiscal control devices employed.
An alternative to direct election is appointment of a comptroller
by the local chief executive to a term extending beyond that of the
current administration. This pattern has been adopted by several
federal oversight agencies.2n Yet, in cities that have a single domi-
nant political party, terms spanning even several administrations
may not result in substantial independence for the comptroller.
The final selection device is used by the General Obligation Bond
Commissions in Nevada counties. They are comprised of representa-
tives from the county government, the school district, incorporated
cities or towns, general improvement districts, and the public.3n Be-
fore a political subdivision can submit to its voters a proposal to issue
general obligation bonds, it must be approved by a majority vote of
the Commission.32 While this approach nicely balances home rule
considerations with the need for agency independence, its effective-
ness may be reduced in counties having but a single city or in those
with strong political party organization at both the city and county
level.
expenses. S. CuFFOR, supra note 314, at 41-42. Although these changes did not in-
crease cash flow in the 1973-1974 budgets by one cent,
they allowed the Board [of Estimate] and [the City] Council to both lower
taxes and increase expenses.
In the corporate world, it is the responsibility of accountants and audi-
tors to prevent such manipulations. But the City's structure encourages this
kind of activity by making the Comptroller the accountant, auditor and
budget-maker. This is somewhat analogous to having a corporate treasurer
serve as both CPA and SEC examiner.
Id. at 42-43. See also SEC STAF REPORT, supra note 124, ch. 2, at 39-45.
320. S. CLFFORD, supra note 314, at 35.
321. In the present climate of fiscal concern by voters, this may not be a serious
problem. A comptroller with substantial auditing and investigative power, media ac-
cess, and an institutionalized referendum procedure may be able to summon the neces-
sary public support.
322. The Comptroller General of the United States, who heads the General Ac-
counting Office, is appointed for a 15-year term by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 31 U.S.C. §§ 42-43 (1976). He may be removed for limited
reasons and only upon a joint resolution of Congress. Id. § 43; see W. Lovett, supra
note 303, at 13, 21.
323. NEv. RFv. STAT. § 350.002 (1977).
324. Id. § 350.004.
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2. Functions of an Oversight Agency
Before-the-fact approval powers of the fiscal oversight agent or
agency should largely be confined to debt financing. Authority to
approve individual expenditures and taxes should be severely lim-
ited. Post-audit powers of a locality's capital, revenue, and expendi-
ture budgets should, however, be far-ranging.3
A fiscal oversight agency can make a great contribution to local
government fiscal responsibility by monitoring attempts to circum-
vent the debt limit in violation of the intergenerational equity princi-
ple, particularly through capitalization of expense items.2 If there is
no debt limit, the agency's role becomes even more important, since
it then must ensure stability as well as intergenerational equity.
Under these circumstances, it should be given the power to approve
or disapprove individual note or bond issues as well as the more
traditional functions of auditing and "whistle-blowing." To preserve
home rule, however, such approval power should be strictly circum-
scribed, so that financial rather than policy aspects of capital projects
will be reviewed. Thus, only the adequacy of revenues projected for
the repayment of revenue bonds, the accuracy of estimates for taxes
and revenues anticipated by TANs and RANs, and the useful life of
projects to be financed by general obligation bonds would be re-
viewed. Excluded from the agency's consideration would be a pro-
ject's social desirability and the relative priority of various projects .3
Similarly, local spending patterns should be closely reviewed to
prevent dual budgeting, overestimates of revenues and underesti-
mates of expenditures, transfers of expense items to the capital
budget, and timely payment of obligations. While important aspects
of fiscal integrity can be handled by such post-audit "whistle-
blowing" and the setting of accounting standards, the delay inherent
in this after-the-fact review may make some pre-approval powers
necessary. It is in this area, however, that considerations of home rule
and fiscal flexibility loom large. While lack of review presents the
danger of local government fiscal irresponsibility, especially in the
absence of a spending limit, there is also a serious risk that a fiscal
oversight agent who can review local spending decisions before the
325. For a summary of post-auditing powers currently possessed by elected and
appointed comptrollers, see S. CLnwFo, supra note 314, app.
326. See notes 143-50 supra and accompanying text.
327. It is, of course, often difficult to draw a definite line between "financial"
and "policy" decisions and the decisions of a powerful financial overseer may easily
fall into the latter category. Thus, great care must be taken to delineate the criteria
that should be employed in making approval decisions, recognizing always that some
policy power will inevitably be exercised by this independent financial agent.
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fact will become entangled in policy disputes or role conflicts1' To
safeguard against the erosion of local control, therefore, the agent's
pre-approval powers over spending should be inversely proportional
to the degree of local responsiveness permitted by his selection proce-
dure.32
Very little direct administrative regulation of local taxation pow-
ers is required. The level of taxation can be determined by the voters
through elections or referenda. Some review of the amount of real
property and other wealth actually standing behind revenue esti-
mates, the extent of taxation needed to meet estimated expenditures,
and the coherence of the overall tax package may, however, be neces-
sary.
3. Coordination With Other Financial Limits
While an independent fiscal oversight agent or agency can pro-
duce many benefits for a local government financial system, its effec-
tive operation requires special arrangements. It must be given sub-
stantial staff support and access to all local government financial
records. In addition, local government officials must be required to
produce these records in a manner that will satisfy the informational
principles discussed above."' The fiscal overseers can then be respon-
sible for presenting the overall figures in a coherent manner to the
general public. Most of all, in defining the function of the oversight
agency, policy-makers must take into account the other control de-
vices regulating local government finance. Thus, in a state with real-
istic debt and spending limits, the agency would primarily monitor
potential avoidance techniques and recommend revisions in the sys-
tem. In a state without such limits, the oversight agency may need
additional approval powers in order to ensure fiscal stability and
intergenerational equity.
328. See S. CLiFFoRD, supra note 314, at 29-30, 37.38, 50-51; note 319 supra.
329. For example, there is less compromise of local responsiveness and fiscal
home rule if a powerful fiscal overseer is directly elected at the local level than if a
state agency exercises the same oversight powers. Even if directly elected, however,
the fiscal overseer's pre-audit powers should not be so extensive as to emasculate other
local officials in the exercise of their discretion.
330. See notes 188-211 supra and accompanying text. See also Lirtzman & Bres-
nick, Out of Bankruptcy: Innovation, EMPnE, Oct.-Nov. 1978, at 42 (detailed descrip-
tion of new computerized Integrated Financial Management System adopted by New
York City to assist it in producing the comprehensive accounting reports required by
City Charter and federal and state statutory provisions enacted in the wake of fiscal
crisis).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article has evaluated the various alternatives for furthering
the historical and contemporary goals of local government debt ceil-
ings, tax limits, and expenditure limits, and has suggested means of
preventing the type of circumvention that has occurred in New York,
Arizona, and other states.
Debt financing appears in need of greatest reform. If constitu-
tional or statutory debt limits are to be retained, the base must be
expanded to include all sources of revenue available to the local gov-
ernment to pay its debt service, not just real property assessments.
Current avoidance mechanisms must be prohibited and a fiscal over-
sight agency established to monitor future attempts at circumvention
if local government debt financing is to reflect the principles of fiscal
stability and intergenerational equity. Short-term debt in particular
requires close attention to prevent abuse. Fiscal flexibility and local
responsiveness can be introduced by allowing referendum override of
the limit.
Severe constitutional taxation limits on local government are
very likely counterproductive. They will not lower overall government
spending but instead will shift power and responsibility to state gov-
ernment, in the process violating principles of fiscal home rule, fiscal
flexibility, and local responsiveness. Tax limitations should be im-
posed, if at all, by statute. Not only real property taxes but also
income and sales taxes must be statutorily controlled to prevent ineq-
uity and to curtail excessive government growth.
Expenditure limits even more severely constrain home rule, local
fiscal flexibility, and local responsiveness. If they are to be employed,
they should be adopted by statute, include growth factors, and allow
for override by referenda.
This Article has evaluated alternative approaches to ensuring
local government fiscal integrity by reference to overriding informa-
tional, economic, and political principles. The fiscal controls consid-
ered should be coordinated to create a general local government fi-
nancial control system. The actual mixture of constitutional, statu-
tory, administrative, voter, and market controls on debt financing,
taxation, and spending by local governments must, however, be de-
termined by the political, economic, and social climate in the partic-
ular state considering such limitsA311 Thus, strength of home rule"2 or
331. It has been argued that the same is true of local government structural
reform. See Note, Conflict Resolution in a Politically Decentralized Local Government
System, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 629, 661-62 (1975) (student work by author).
332. Even the strongest home rule tradition may give way in the face of a serious
financial crisis. In order to weather the New York City fiscal crisis, for example, nearly
all groups have accepted the virtually complete financial control assumed by the state-
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voter referenda traditions," type of political party organization,"'
size of cities, existing local government structures, tax base peculari-
ties,3 and extent (if any) of local government fiscal crisisP' must
determine the final configuration of any local government financial
system.
dominated Emergency Financial Control Board, see Act of June 2, 1978, ch. 201, 1978
N.Y. Laws 391; Official Statement, supra note 67, at 40-43, and by the Municipal
Assistance Corporation, see N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 3030-3040 (McKinney Supp.
1977). See generally MAC REPORT., supra note 66; Shalala & Bellamy, supra note 67,
at 1127-32. Moreover, in order to obtain federal guarantees for some of its securities,
the City has to agree to subject itself to the fiscal monitoring and control of the
Emergency Financial Control Board for the life of the guarantees (possibly through
1997), to have its financial statements audited by the United States General Account-
ing Office, and to appoint a City Productivity Council to improve labor productivity.
See 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1521-1527 (West Supp. 1979); Supplemental Staff Report, supra
note 208, at 972-73.
333. California already has a strong tradition of voter referenda, see James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1971), and the popularity of initiatives and referenda
is rapidly increasing in other states. See Herbers, supra note 291.
334. Strong organization by a single political party at both the city and county
level may make it more difficult to obtain a truly independent fiscal overseer at the
local level by either election or appointment. See text following note 322 supra. On the
other hand, local political party organization may increase voter participation in local
referenda. Relative strength of political parties at the state and local level is also
important in determining the degree of state control exercised by any local government
financial system.
335. Localities that rely primarily upon real estate taxes imposed on land with
diminishing natural resources may be subject to special controls. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 471.71-.83 (1978).
336. See note 332 supra.
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